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Scrubbing the Wash
Sale Rules

By
David M. Schizer

'2004 D.M. Schizer

Loss limitations are an ugly but
inevitable feature of any realization-based income tax. In essence,
because the system mismeasures
gains, it also has to mismeasure
losses. Otherwise, the "timing option" inherent in the realization
rule would allow taxpayers to defer
gains (thereby reducing the tax's
present value) while accelerating
losses (thereby preserving the
deduction's present value). This
"strategic trading" would erode
the tax on risky positions, leading
to inefficiencies as taxpayers developed a taste for risky positions,
became "locked in" to appreciated
positions, and sold loss positions
they otherwise would keep. Distributional issues also would
arise as the effective tax rate on
capital income fell.' In theory, we
could address these problems by
abandoning the realization rule
but, for reasons of politics and
administrability, this article assumes that the tax on gains cannot
be accelerated. Instead, this article
seeks to curtail the timing option
by deferring losses.
The wash sale regime of Section
1091 is one of our system's most
important brakes on the timing
option.4 In broad outline, this
regime defers a taxpayer's deduction when she sells a position at
a loss ("the loss position") and,
within a specified period of time
("the window period"), acquires
an economically similar position

("the replacement position"). Yet
the wash sale regime is quite old,
and the recent bear market has
further exposed its frailty. Indeed,
it is only a slight exaggeration to
say that compliance with the
regime is voluntary for very
wealthy taxpayers-or, at least,
for those who are willing to take
aggressive positions.
In response, this article flags
seven glitches in the regime that,
at least arguably, permit "perfect
end runs." As used here, this phrase
refers to strategies in which taxpayers can deduct losses while effecting
virtually no change in their economic
position. For example, some advisors believe the regime does not
apply to "periodic" equity swaps'
or to certain strategies involving
out-of-the-money call options.
Most of these perfect end runs are
already controversial under current
law. Indeed, many tax lawyers conclude that they do not "work." Yet
at least some advisors continue to
recommend these strategies, so clear
guidance is needed. The essential
point is that, if we are going to have
a wash sale regime, these end runs
should not be allowed. A deduction
is inappropriate if taxpayers have
made essentially no change in their
economic position.

David M. Schizer is the Wilbur H. Friedman Professor of Tax Law at Columbia
Law School.
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In addition to identifying
perfect end runs, this article
also takes a more controversial
position: Losses still should be
deferred-even when taxpayers
make meaningful changes in
their economic position-as long
as they keep material elements of
their old return. This article offers
two justifications for this broad
loss deferral. First, under the "parity" goal, it should be difficult to
accelerate losses because it is so
easy, under current law, to defer
gains. Put another way, since
modest economic changes do not
trigger gains, they should not trigger losses either. Second, under the
"effectiveness" goal, the regime
should be sufficiently tough that
taxpayers actually give up on taxmotivated loss harvesting, instead
of merely pursuing this planning
in a more sophisticated way.
The policy goal here, then, is to
ensure that, on average, taxpayers
expect losses to be deferred as long
as gains. One way to implement
this objective is to coordinate the
wash sale regime with the constructive sale regime of Section
12597: Since taxpayers can defer
gain under Section 1259 when
they keep only a portion of their
investment's economic return
(e.g., appreciation from $100 to
$120 on an asset that is worth
$100), they should have to defer
loss under Section 1091 whenever
they keep an equivalently modest
fraction of the return (e.g., a call
spread offering the same $100 to
$120 of appreciation). In general,
any replacement position that offers as much economic exposure
as a $100-$120 call spread should
trigger a wash sale.' The goal
here is not to propose this "call
spread" approach as a statutory
test, since the standard would be
hard to administer. Rather, the
"call spread" approach is offered
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as a theory for policymakers to
determine the "right" answer as a
matter of policy.
Fortunately, current law already
comes to the right answer in some
cases. Most importantly, it finds a
wash sale when stock is replaced
with a call option. Commentators generally attack this result as
overbroad, since options are economically different from stock.9
In response, this article defends
this widely criticized rule, showing
that it is appropriate in light of
our system's generous treatment of
gains. Of course, other aspects of
current law do not conform to the
"call spread" theory. In
response,
this article recommends specific
changes (or at least clarifications)
of current law. For instance, a
wash sale should be triggered
when stock replaces a call option,
when a put option replaces a short
sale, 1 when equity-linked life insurance replaces an investment in
the underlying equity, and when
one sector-specific mutual fund
replaces another. After making
the case for a tougher wash sale regime, the article cautions that this
case is less strong if the regime can
never be tough enough to stop loss
harvesting (e.g., because taxpayers
can always ensure the deduction
by accepting a sufficiently drastic
change in economics). If this outcome is likely, other constraints
on the timing option may be
preferable, including accelerated
timing for gains or a broader
capital loss regime.
Part I offers an overview of
Section 1091. Part II outlines efficiency and equity justifications
for this regime and describes its
interplay with the capital loss limitation. Part III flags seven perfect
end runs, and also an instance
of overbreadth involving short
sales. Part IV offers the case for a
broader regime.

I. Overview of the
Wash Sale Regime
In general, the wash sale rules of
Section 1091 limit a taxpayer's
ability to deduct losses from selling depreciated stock or securities
if, within a specified period of
time, the taxpayer replaces this
property by acquiring substantially identical stock or securities
or by entering into a contract or
option to acquire substantially
identical stock or securities.1" For
instance, assume that a taxpayer
sells a share of ABC common
stock with a basis of $100 for
$80 on November 1. He cannot
deduct this loss if he purchases a
share of ABC common stock on
November 2 -or, indeed, at any
time beginning 30 days before the
loss position is sold and ending
thirty days thereafter.
If Section 1091 applies, it defers
the taxpayer's deduction, effectively adding it to the basis of
the replacement position. Under
Section 1091(d), the basis of the
loss position generally carries over
to the replacement position,1 2 as
does the holding period. 3 Thus,
if a taxpayer sells property with
a basis of $100 for $80, and immediately purchases substantially
identical property for $80, the
taxpayer's basis in this replacement position is $100. If he later
sells it in a transaction that is not
a wash sale for $80, he recognizes
a $20 loss. 4
The regime also includes
special rules that match loss
positions with replacement positions. In general, a chronological
convention determines which
loss position is the subject of
a wash sale if more than one is
15
sold during the window period,
or if the loss position is larger
(or smaller) than the replaceme, t 16
ment position.
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II. Policy Goals of the
Wash Sale Regime

backstop. These familiar points
are briefly considered in turn.

At first blush, the wash sale rules
are puzzling. When investments
lose value, taxpayers suffer real
economic losses. Once the investments are sold, there is no question
about the amount of this loss. So
why shouldn't it be deductible?
After all, our system is supposed
to measure ability to pay, and an
investor with losses has less to
contribute than an investor with
gains. So why does the system turn
a blind eye to these losses?
The answer is that, in a realization-based system, the tax
law already turns a blind eye
to gains. The need to match
the treatment of losses with the
treatment of gains is familiar.
After all, if we reduced the capital gains rate to zero, would we
still allow taxpayers to deduct
capital losses? Likewise, should
taxpayers be allowed a deduction
when investments in a Roth IRA
lose value? 17 The same question
is posed when the tax on gains
is reduced through deferral, instead of a rate cut. Under current
law, deferring gains is easy, even
if taxpayers eliminate most of
their exposure to the appreciated
asset. Given this generous treatment of gains, losses also need
to be deferred when taxpayers
keep enough exposure. Unless
the deductibility of losses is
limited, the government loses

A. Revenue and
the Timing Option

substantial revenue, investment

allocations are distorted, and
distributional issues arise as the
effective tax rate on investment
income declines (and may even
become negative). While Section
1091 obviously is not the system's
only constraint on the timing
option, it provides significant
reinforcement to the capital
loss limitation, a more general

In our realization-based system,
taxpayers can erode the present
value of tax through deferral,
and can eliminate the tax entirely through a basis step-up
at death. 18 In contrast, if the
investment declines in value, the
tax-reducing strategy is to sell it
immediately, triggering a current
deduction whose present value is
not reduced by deferral. It is well
understood that this strategic
trading, if unconstrained, causes
dramatic declines in government
revenue. For example, while
deferring investment gains, taxpayers will use investment losses
to shelter income from other
sources, including their salaries.
In response, the wash sale regime
protects government revenue by
making it more difficult to deduct losses.
B. Efficiency and
the Timing Option
1. Efficiency Costs of the Timing
Option. An unconstrained timing
option also breeds inefficiency. As
Daniel Shaviro has emphasized, it
distorts investment decisions both
ex ante and ex post." The ex ante
distortion arises when taxpayers
choose which investments to
buy. The source of the distortion
is that, if the timing option is
unconstrained, the government's
share of gains on any investment
is smaller than its share of losses.
This uneven allocation raises the
after-tax present value of any bet.2"
Increasing the riskiness of the bet
intensifies this effect, causing the
after-tax fair market value to rise
even further. In other words, the
timing option creates a tax-based
preference for risk.2'

In addition to influencing which
investments taxpayers buy, the timing option also affects which ones
they sell. There are two versions of
this ex post distortion. First, taxpayers tend to keep investments that
have appreciated, even if they would
prefer to hold something else. This
phenomenon is commonly called
"lock-in." Second, taxpayers tend to
sell investments that have declined
in value, even if22they otherwise
would keep them.
These distortions cause social
waste in three ways. First, taxpayers are less happy with their
portfolios. They do not necessarily have the investments they want
most. Second, market prices are
distorted-for instance, risky and
recently appreciated investments
are likely to be overpriced-causing resources to be misallocated.2
Third, taxpayers engage in wasteful
planning strategies to circumvent
the rules. For example, instead of
selling appreciated property, they
use derivatives to hedge. This
planning can mitigate the first
two problems-making taxpayers happier with their portfolios
and improving the accuracy of
market prices (i.e., since taxpayers
who want to sell are, in effect, doing so). But this self-help causes
its own social waste in the form
of advisory fees, time and energy
devoted to planning, and deal
structures that otherwise do not
make sense.
2. Efficiency Benefits of Wash
Sale Rules. By constraining the
timing option, the wash sale rules
can mitigate some of these distortions. The goal is to discourage
tax-motivated sales. To do so, the
wash sale regime burdens loss
harvesting with a nontax cost
(or so-called "friction"): taxpayers have to give up economic
exposure to the depreciated asset
(or double their exposure) for a
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specified period. The hope is that
this friction is so unappealing that
taxpayers choose, instead, to forgo
the tax deduction.24
If taxpayers choose this tax-expensive route-and the word "if"
is quite important, as emphasized
below-the wash sale rules offer
efficiency benefits. Taxpayers are
happier with their portfolios.
Market prices are more accurate,
since there is no barrage of taxmotivated sales to depress prices.
In addition, by discouraging loss
harvesting, ex post, the wash sale
rules mitigate the tax-based preference for risk, ex ante. If taxpayers
expect losses to be deferred to the
same extent as gains, risky assets
no longer have special appeal.
3. Efficiency Costs of the Wash
Sale Regime. Yet these efficiency
benefits are not complete or, for
that matter, free. Obviously, the
wash sale rules do not prevent
planning strategies to defer gains.
The regime adds complexity to
the Internal Revenue Code ("the
Code"), raising administrative
costs. It also is overbroad in some
cases, blocking behavior that is
not tax-motivated. For instance,
a taxpayer who sells depreciated
property because she no longer
wants it (i.e., and not merely to
harvest losses) may then be deterred from reacquiring it when
circumstances change. To an extent, taxpayers caught in this sort
of bind may lose confidence in the
tax system, a potentially significant cost in a system that depends
on voluntary compliance.
These costs arise even if the
wash sale regime "works"-that is,
if it actually stops loss harvesting.
What if this is not so? What if the
regime is not tough enough to actually stop the practice, but merely
makes it more costly? In this case,
from an efficiency standpoint, the
regime is counterproductive. Tax-
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payers still change their behavior
in response to taxes (i.e., by selling
depreciated assets that they otherwise would keep), but they have
to go to greater lengths to do it.
Social waste increases as taxpayers
make greater sacrifices to claim the
deduction, but there is no corresponding increase in revenue. Put
another way, the wash sale rules
have a more positive influence
on marginal taxpayers (who are
deterred from harvesting losses)
than on inframarginal taxpayers
(who are not deterred).2 5
To sum up, the wash sale regime
can enhance the efficiency of a realization-based system, but only if
crafted with care. Complexity and
uncertainty can breed excessive
administrative costs. Overbreadth
can deter "good" transactions that
are not tax motivated. Finally, the
regime needs to be tough enough
to reach the tipping point where
enough taxpayers are actually
deterred from harvesting losses.
Policymakers should balance these
various goals in a way that minimizes overall waste. In addition,
other measures are needed to address lock-in and the deferral of
gains, a topic that is beyond this
article's scope.
C. Equity
1. Vertical Equity. In addition to

promoting efficiency goals, the
wash sale rules also can make the
tax system more equitable. Unless
the timing option is constrained,
the effective tax rate on investment
income is quite low, especially for
risky assets.2" Indeed, sophisticated
taxpayers are likely to generate
deductible investment losses to
shelter other income. This low
(or even negative) tax burden on
investments raises vertical equity
concerns since investment income
is concentrated among wealthier
taxpayers. The wash sale rules can

promote vertical equity, then, by
constraining the timing option
and thus raising the tax burden
on investment income.
Two caveats are important here,
though. First, it is difficult to
make judgments about vertical
equity without considering other
aspects of the tax system. In
theory, a low tax burden on the
investment income of wealthy taxpayers (due to the timing option)
can be offset, for instance, by a
correspondingly high tax burden
on their wages. Thus, a tougher
wash sale regime is only one way
to promote vertical equity, and it
may not be the best way.
Second, assuming that vertical
equity goals should be pursued
through the wash sale regime, vertical equity is clearly enhanced if
the wash sale rules are effective for
all taxpayers. Yet if the wealthiest
taxpayers can avoid this regime
with sophisticated planning,
while moderately wealthy taxpayers cannot, the wash sale rules have
an ambiguous effect on vertical
equity. Since moderately wealthy
taxpayers still have relatively high
incomes, the regime is helpful in
raising the tax burden on their
investment income. Yet this vertical equity advantage obviously
is incomplete-and, indeed, is
undermined-if even wealthier
taxpayers avoid the regime with
ease. The implication, then, is
policymakers should target "highend" avoidance strategies, as well
as "mainstream" ones.
2. HorizontalEquity. There also
is a plausible case for the wash
sale rules on horizontal equity
grounds-that is, the idea that like
taxpayers should be taxed alike.
For instance, consider two (otherwise identical) taxpayers, Andrew
and Bill, who buy XYZ stock for
$100, and its value declines to $60.
Assume that one continues to hold
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the stock while the other sells and
immediately repurchases it. Given
their similarity, Andrew and Bill
presumably should be treated the
same way. Under a realization
system, this means neither gets to
deduct the loss.
Yet this horizontal equity defense is less persuasive once we
add a third (otherwise identical)
taxpayer, Charlie, who sells his
XYZ stock and does not repurchase it. All three have the same
economic loss, but only Charlie
can claim a deduction, since the
wash sale rules do not reach him.
Why is he more deserving than
the other two? The traditional
answer is that Charlie severs economic ties with the stock, thereby
making a "real" sale, and this difference justifies a deduction in
a realization-based system. Yet
this reasoning leans very heavily
on the realization rule-not just
on the fact that it is the law, but
on the idea that it should be the
law on a deeper normative level.
This reasoning imputes (perhaps
surprising) moral authority to a
rule that exists for administrative
convenience.27 Are people who sell
depreciated property really more
deserving of a low tax bill than
those who keep it? If we look to
more fundamental policy values,
such as the desire to base burdens
on ability to pay, it obviously
becomes much harder to distinguish Charlie from Andrew and
Bill. They all have suffered an
economic loss.
To sum up, then, there are equity-based justifications for the
wash sale rules, sounding in both
vertical and horizontal equity,
but each is subject to objections.
Why should we pursue distributive justice in this manner, instead
of by adjusting the rate schedule
for wages? Why should we favor a
taxpayer who does not repurchase

depreciated property over one who
does? In light of these concerns,
efficiency justifications are this
article's principal focus.

D. Imperfect Overlap with
the Capital Loss Limitations
Before turning to the details of
Section 1091, it is worth emphasizing that other loss deferral regimes
also constrain the timing option.
The most general backstop is the
capital loss limitation.28 Corporate
taxpayers cannot deduct capital
losses unless they have capital
gains. Individuals are similarly
constrained, except that they can
deduct $3,000 of capital losses
each year from ordinary income.
This regime is a fairly effective
constraint on the timing option,
since taxpayers cannot deduct
losses unless they are also recognizing gains. When the capital loss
limitations do the necessary work,
Section 1091 is redundant. Consider investors in the Internet bubble
who now have large reservoirs of
capital losses. These investors are
effectively subject to a zero tax rate
on any new capital-gain-yielding
investments. The wash sale rules
have no effect on them, since
they cannot deduct losses anyway.
This reality reduces the need for
a tough wash sale regime but, at
the same time, reduces the harm
it could cause (for instance, from
overbreadth or complexity).29
Even so, the overlap between
Section 1211 and Section 1091 is
incomplete, so that a tough wash
sale regime can still make two
important contributions. First,
the capital loss limitation keeps
capital losses from sheltering
ordinary income, but obviously
does not prevent the sheltering
of capital gain. As a result, the
regime keeps the effective tax rate
on capital gain from falling below
zero, but does not ensure that it

will be above zero. Yet policymakers may prefer a positive effective
tax rate on vertical equity grounds
or, for that matter, on efficiency
grounds if collecting this tax is
less distortive than other taxes.
Indeed, a zero rate is of particular concern because capital gain is
defined porously, including wages
and interest-based returns in some
cases."' Needless to say, there are
many ways to raise the tax burden
on capital gain, but a tough wash
sale regime can play a role by raising the cost of loss harvesting.
Second, if the taxpayer already
has gains that she must recognize
in a given year, the capital loss
limitations have no effect on any
other investments she has. Consider a wealthy investor who puts
a fraction of her portfolio into a
hedge fund, which generates an
impressive pretax return but a lot
of short-term capital gain each
year. On her other investments,
the capital loss limitations do
not constrain her timing option,
which can be extremely valuable.
She is likely to favor riskier investments, and her effective rate
on them can be negative. While
deferring any gains on these new
investments, she can use losses
to shelter the short-term hedge
fund gain that she otherwise
has to recognize. Thus, while the
capital loss limitation constrains
the timing option to an extent, a
tough wash sale regime can make
an important contribution here
as well.

11. Perfect End-Runs
Around the Wash
Sale Regime
Needless to say, the wash sale rules
do not serve as a backstop for the
capital loss limitation-and, more
generally, they do not enhance
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efficiency or equity-if Section
1091 is easy to avoid. It should
not be possible, then, to replace
loss positions with substitutes
offering virtually the same economic return. This article calls
such a step a "perfect end-run."
By tolerating perfect end-runs, the
system collects less revenue while
favoring risky positions. In effect,
we have a lower-of-cost-or-market
(LCM) system, in which gains are
deferred and losses are currently
recognized. In important ways,
though, perfect end runs can be
worse than LCM: They require
elaborately wasteful planning (an
efficiency concern) and thus are
open only to very wealthy taxpayers (a vertical equity concern). As
a result, blocking perfect end runs
should be uncontroversial. If we
are going to have a wash sale regime, we need to fill these gaps.
This Part identifies seven
perfect end runs.3' Like weeds,
they spring up through cracks
in a very old regime. After all,
most of Section 1091's operative
provisions were drafted more
than half a century before the
over-the-counter derivatives
market began to develop. While
end runs typically depend on
close readings of language and
technical distinctions, there is
precedent for reading Section
1091 in this precise way. 2 As a result, some of these strategies are
endorsed by top law firms. This
is not to say that all (or, for that
matter, any) of these perfect end
runs clearly work under current
law. Section 1091 is an anti-abuse
regime, which judges may (and
certainly should) read broadly
in light of the underlying
policy. Yet aggressive taxpayers
find ample room to maneuver
here.33 In response, the government should give clear guidance
that these strategies do not work.
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In most of these cases, a revenue
ruling will suffice.
A. (Arguable) Omission
of Swaps
Since the main function of the
wash sale rules is to curtail the
timing option, the regime should
apply to any investment subject
to realization accounting that is
liquid enough to permit strategic
trading. There is less need for the
regime in illiquid markets, since
high transactions costs can discourage strategic trading. 4 Fortunately,
most liquid investments are covered under the wash sale rules. As
a technical matter, they qualify as
"stock or securities," which are the
magic words under Section 1091. 3"
Yet even though derivatives can be
quite liquid, these modern instruments have sometimes slipped
through the cracks.36
1. Derivatives As Loss Positions. The wash sale rules have
been slow to treat derivatives as loss
positions, waffling on the question
of whether these instruments are
"securities" within the meaning
of Section 1091. The code does
not define the term consistently.
Sometimes it includes swaps, options and forward contracts, but
sometimes it does not.37 The wash
sale rules do not reference any of
these other definitions. A number
of authorities have grappled with
the question, not necessarily consistently.3" Then in 1988, the Tax
Court concluded that options did
thus
not qualify as "securities," and
39
positions.
loss
be
could not
In response, Congress amended
the statute in 1988 to ensure that
options could qualify as loss positions. A final sentence was added
to Section 1091(a): "For purposes
of this section, the term 'stock or
securities' shall, except as provided
in regulations, include contracts or
options to acquire or sell stock or

securities."4 It is clear, then, that
options qualify as loss positions.
Physically-settled forward contracts
also indisputably fall within the
phrase "contracts ... to acquire or

sell stock or securities."
However, this language arguably does not cover cash-settled
forward contracts and swaps even
though these instruments present
the same potential for abuse: Since
the underlying property does not
change hands, nothing is "acquired." The addition of Section
1091(o in 2000 has helped resolve
this issue: "This section shall not
fail to apply to a contract or option to acquire or sell stock or
securities solely by reason of the
fact that the contract or option
will settle in (or could be settled
in) cash or property other than
such stock or securities." To paraphrase, cash settled contracts can
qualify as "contracts to acquire."
Nevertheless, some advisors
still distinguish certain types
of swap contracts-specifically,
those on which fluctuations in
the underlying property's value
are settled through periodic payments, instead of through a single
payment at maturity.1 These periodically-settled swaps are said to
differ from cash-settled forward
contracts, given the timing of
their payments, and thus are not
"contracts to acquire." 42 Indeed,
there are other places within the
Code where swaps and forward
contracts are treated differently.43
Guidance is needed (e.g., in a revenue ruling) to clarify that Section
1091(f should not be read in this
cramped way.
2. Derivatives As Replacement
Positions. Similar issues arise in
determining whether derivatives
trigger the wash sale regime when
they replace some other position
that has been sold as a loss. The
statute expressly applies when
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a taxpayer "has entered into a
contract or option so to acquire,
substantially identical stock
or securities." It is clear, then,
that call options and physically
settled forward contracts trigger
the regime (as does the sale of 44a
deep-in-the-money put option).
Cash-settled forward contracts
are also expressly covered under
Section 1091().
Yet questions remain about
periodic swaps, as discussed
above. Some argue that the wash
sale regime does not apply when
a taxpayer sells ABC stock at a
loss and enters into a total return
periodic swap. This is a bizarre
result, since a periodic swap offers virtually the same economic
exposure as a share. 5 It obviously
is inefficient to create a tax-based
incentive to replace loss positions
with periodic swaps. In addition,
over-the-counter derivatives are
available only to wealthy and
sophisticated investors, an advantage that raises vertical equity
concerns.

B. Doubling up
with a Hedged Position
Taxpayers use derivatives to
exploit other technical glitches
in the wash sale rules as well.
In the periodic-swap strategy
described above, the question is
whether a taxpayer has acquired
a replacement position (i.e., because periodic swaps arguably do
not qualify). In contrast, a second
strategy turns not on whether-but
on when-a replacement position
is acquired. This "when" question
is relevant because a wash sale is
triggered only if the replacement
position is acquired during the
window period.
There obviously is no wash sale
if the replacement position is acquired before the window period
begins. As an example of this

familiar "doubling up" strategy,
assume that a taxpayer plans to
sell stock at a loss on November 1.
If she buys stock before the wash
sale period begins-for instance,
on September 29-her loss is not
disallowed. In order to deduct the
loss, then, she needs to double her
investment for 31 days.
Yet taxpayers often do not want
this extra exposure. Instead, they
prefer to "double up" in form,
but not in substance, by hedging
the extra share they hold during the window period. If such
hedging is allowed, taxpayers can
claim their loss without changing their economic exposure in
a meaningful way.
To begin with the simplest variation, which the wash sale regime
explicitly forecloses, what if the
taxpayer hedges with a short sale?
For example, assume that the taxpayer owns one depreciated share
with a basis of $50. On September
29, she purchases a second share
for $30. On the same day, she sells
a share short (i.e., by selling a borrowed share). More than a month
later, on November 2, she "covers"
the short sale with the depreciated
share. In other words, she uses this
share to settle up with the party
that lent the shares sold in the short
sale. Can the taxpayer recognize the
$20 loss? 4' Economically, the taxpayer feels as if he has owned one,
and only one, share of stock for the
entire period." Yet, technically, do
the wash sale rules apply?
The key question is whether the
depreciated shares are treated as
sold on November 2 (when the
short sale is covered) or on September 29 (when the short sale is
initiated). If the November date
is used, then enough time has
elapsed between this sale and the
purchase of replacement property
(i.e., on September 29). Absent a
special rule, this would be the an-

swer because, in general, a short
sale is consummated for tax purposes on the date it is covered, and
not on the date it is initiatedi 8
However, Reg. §1.1091-1(g) blocks
this result." Under this regulation, the depreciated property is
deemed sold-not when the short
is covered-but when the short
sale is initiated. In the above example, then, the depreciated stock
is deemed sold (i.e., through the
short sale) on September 29, which
is the same day the new share is
purchased."0 Thus, the wash sale
1
rules clearly apply."
Although Reg. §1.1091-1(g)
keeps taxpayers from hedging
with short sales, it does not explicitly address derivatives such
as forward contracts, collars and
swaps, and some advisors contend
that certain types of hedging are
permissible. For instance, assume
again that the taxpayer owns one
depreciated share with a basis of
$50 and, on September 29, purchases a second share for $30. On
the same day, instead of selling a
share short, she enters into a short
"periodic" equity swap, through
which she pays amounts based
on appreciation in the stock and
receives amounts based on depreciation in the stock. On November
2, she terminates the swap and
sells the depreciated share.
Although the economic effect
is that she has been "long" one
(and only one) share during the
entire period, some advisors
argue that this transaction does
not trigger a wash sale. The claim
is that Reg. §1.1091-1(g) does not
apply because a periodic swap is
formally different from a short
sale.5 2 In response, more conservative advisors offer reasons why
the wash sale rules could still
apply on these facts, including
Section 1233,5 3 business pur-5-

pose, 54 an old revenue ruling,
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and the holding period rules. 5'
Yet there is uncertainty on these
issues, and some advisors take
the view that transactions like
these "work." As a result, clear
guidance (e.g., in a revenue ruling) is needed that hedging-based
end runs are not permissible.

C. Out of the
Money Call Options
The two derivatives-based end runs
described above game the rules
concerning whether and when a
replacement position has been acquired. Not surprisingly, there also
is a perfect end run concerning
which new position qualifies as the
replacement position. Ironically,
the goal of this strategy is to trigger
a wash sale-but to trigger it with
the purchase of a deep out-of-themoney option, in effect clearing
the way for the purchase of a
"real" replacement position. The
following example illustrates the
advantage of this deliberate wash
sale. If all goes according to plan,
the taxpayer claims a deductible
loss without materially changing
her economic position.
Assume that the taxpayer sells
1,000 shares of depreciated stock
("the old lot") for $70 per share
on November 1, realizing a loss
of $ 100,000. If taxpayer purchases
1,000 new shares ("the new lot")
the next day, she obviously cannot deduct this loss. But what if
she adds a step? On November 1,
minutes after she sells the old lot,
and the day before she buys the
new one, the taxpayer buys out-ofthe-money call options, entitling
her to buy 1,000 shares for $400
per share on December 11 (40 days
later). Because the options have
a short term and are deep-out-ofthe-money, the premium is very
modest (e.g., $0.30 per share or
$300). Then, on November 2, she
buys the new lot of stock.

What is the advantage of buying
these out-of-the-money options
before buying the new stock? The
point is to add a second acquisition within the wash sale period.
This strategy rests on the idea that
only one of these acquisitions
triggers a wash sale, and thus
inherits the disallowed loss as
additional basis. 7 Under current
law, chronological order decides
the question. 8 Since the options
are acquired first, the taxpayer
claims that the options trigger
the wash sale.5" The taxpayer's argument, then, is that the basis in
the option increases by $100,000
(i.e., to $100,300).' ° Assuming the
option expires 40 days later, on
December 12, the taxpayer hopes
to deduct this $100,300 loss in
the current year-even though
she purchased a new lot of stock
a day after selling the old lot of
stock."l Of course, the loss would
not be deductible if expiration of
the option was itself a wash sale.
Happily for the taxpayer, though,
there are two reasons why Section
1091 seems not to apply when the
option expires. First, the purchase
of stock on November 2 is more
than 31 days before the option
expires (i.e., on December

11 )."

Second, the stock in the new lot
is not substantially identical to
the option (i.e., since the option
is out-of-the-money). 3
If this strategy "works," the
net effect is that the taxpayer
replaces the old stock with new
stock almost immediately, but
still deducts the loss. The price
of circumventing Section 1091 is
a modest expenditure on economically insubstantial options. Yet
the words "economically insubstantial" are worth emphasizing.
This strategy is less obviously an
end run around current law-and
thus is less attractive to taxpayers
and less objectionable to the gov-

ernment-if the options represent
a genuine investment. Indeed, if
the taxpayer buys in-the-money
options with long terms, the transaction becomes a version of the
traditional doubling up strategywith the (relatively unimportant)
variation that the taxpayer holds
options instead of extra stock. 4
A key problem here, then, is that
the option is not economically
meaningful and thus should lack
business purpose under current
law. Yet advisors obviously vary
in their judgments about business
purpose, and some are willing to
bless aggressive transactions. As a
result, clearer guidance is needed
here. For instance, the government
could use a revenue ruling to target deep out-of-the-money options
on business purpose grounds.

D. Replacing Short Sales
with Short over-the-Counter
Derivatives
In still another derivatives-based
end run, some believe the wash sale
regime is also underinclusive in
its treatment of short positions. A
special provision, Section 1091(e),
governs wash sales involving
short sales." This provision finds
a wash sale if, within the wash sale
period, "another short sale of (or
securities future contract to sell)
substantially identical stock or
securities was entered into." 67
What if an unprofitable short
sale is replaced with an over-thecounter short forward contract or
swap? These contracts offer near
perfect replication of a short sale,
aside from credit, leverage, and
liquidity issues. Even so, some advisors believe the wash sale rules
do not apply for two reasons. First,
they conclude that the short sale
rule of Section 1091(e) does not
reach over-the-counter derivatives
on the theory that these instruments are not "short sales." Indeed,
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these advisors emphasize that Section 1091(e) was amended to add
securities futures-a step that was
needed, they argue, because securities futures are different from
short sales. If securities futures are
different, then over-the-counter derivatives arguably are different too.
But this amendment did not also
add over-the-counter derivatives, a
negative pregnant that gives these
advisors comfort. 8
Second, some advisors conclude
that Section 1091 (a) does not reach
these instruments. Even if Section
1091(e) doesn't apply, Section
1091(a) would still find a wash
sale if the taxpayer "acquires" a
"stock or security" upon entering
into these instruments. Yet some
authorities suggest that short positions cannot be "acquired" because
they are not assets.69 Other advisors
disagree, noting that the statute
specifically includes "contracts ...
to sell stock or securities" in the70
definition of "stock or securities.
Needless to say, the regime should
reach these transactions, and guidance (e.g., in a ruling) is needed to
ensure that it does.
E. Credit Risk
While the first four perfect end
runs deal with derivative securities,
the fifth has somewhat broader
application: Aggressive taxpayers
sometimes give too much weight
to minor differences in credit risk
between the loss and replacement
positions. This strategy relies on
very old authorities concerning
debt securities, a risky strategy
since modern courts may well reject these old fashioned precedents
(or, at least, may resist applying
them to investments that are not
debt).' Under the statute, a wash
sale is triggered if the replacement
position is "substantially identical" to the loss position.72 Some
courts have read the "substantially

identical" standard to require an
extremely close economic similarity. Thus, differences in collateral
have caused two debt securities
not to be substantially identical."
Similarly, the fact that securities
are issued by formally different
entities has been adequate to
avoid a wash sale, even when the
securities are all guaranteed by the
federal government.'
This is not to say that credit risk
should never be relevant. Obviously, a taxpayer who replaces a
Treasury with a junk bond is significantly changing her economic
position, and thus is not engaging
in a perfect end run.75 Yet credit
risk is unimportant if the relevant
credits are roughly comparable.
For instance, a taxpayer might
replace a call option purchased
from Morgan Stanley with one
purchased from Goldman Sachs.
Similarly, a taxpayer might replace
an over-the-counter forward contract with an exchange-traded
securities future.76 Assuming the
term and strike prices of these
pairs of positions are the same,
the main difference is credit risk.
Likewise, a taxpayer might replace
one indexed mutual fund with
another. Even if both are based
on the same index (e.g.,
the S&P
500), so that they offer virtually
identical economic returns,"' the
two funds involve formally different credit risks: They are distinct
entities and may be managed by
different management companies
(e.g, Vanguard versus Fidelity).78
Thus, if someone slips and falls
in one office, but not in another,
the tort judgment will modestly
affect economic returns.79
The reality is that investors are
unlikely to notice such differences.
After all, how often is a regulated
securities dealer's credit so poor
that it cannot honor a contract?
Aggressive taxpayers should not be

able to invoke these minor differences to avoid a wash sale. The
government should issue guidance
(e.g., in a ruling) that credit risk
is not taken into account under
Section 1091 for derivatives or equity-based mutual funds when the
relevant credits are comparable.
F. Omission of Commodities
The regime also is underinclusive in omitting commodities or
commodities-based derivatives.
Technically, these instruments
do not qualify as "stock" or
securities.""0 This omission is
unimportant for exchange-traded
commodities futures since these are
marked to market under Section
1256. But commodities themselves,
and also over-the-counter commodities derivatives, are not marked to
market. Although investing directly
in commodities is not always easy,
since significant transactions costs
are sometimes involved, this market may still be liquid enough to
permit strategic trading. To reach
commodities, a statutory amendment probably is needed."'
6.Omission of a
Related Party Rule
The final gap is that Section 1091
does not have a related party
rule.82 For example, assume that
a taxpayer sells stock at a loss on
December 31 and, on the same day,
his wife buys the stock. Under a
literal reading of the statute, there
is no wash sale. The statute does
not explicitly require husbands
and wives (or, for that matter,
parents and children, or entities
and their owners) to be treated as
one taxpayer for these purposes.
To a significant extent, courts
have filled this gap. They sometimes
have invoked Section 267, which
disallows losses in sales "directly or
indirectly" to related parties." In
other cases, courts have fashioned
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a common law of wash sales, holding that not enough has changed
in the taxpayer's situation to justify a tax deduction." Although
this judicial gap-filling has been
helpful, the cases are fact-specific,
and sometimes are in tension with
each other. 5 As a result, a statutory
amendment adding a related party
rule would be helpful (though,
perhaps, not essential).
H. Remedying Obvious
Overbreadth: Going from
Short to Long
So far, this Part has focused on
instances in which the wash sale
rules are obviously underinclusive.
In contrast, this Section focuses on
the opposite problem: an instance
in which the regime is obviously
overinclusive. Notwithstanding this
change in focus, this issue is connected to the preceding discussion;
like the other glitches identified in
this Part, the need to reform this
one should be uncontroversial.
A special rule, Section 1091(e),
is needed to govern short sales
because the main wash sale provision, Section 1091(a), does not
reach a taxpayer who closes a short
sale at a loss and immediately enters into a new short sale. Section
1091(a) is triggered only if a taxpayer acquires stock or securities
during the window period, but not
if she sels stock or securities."
Unfortunately, Section 1091(a)
is also overinclusive as applied to
short sales. As a technical matter,
it seems to apply to a taxpayer
who closes a short sale at a loss
and decides to purchase additional
stock as a "long." For example, assume that a taxpayer has shorted
stock at $60 and, on December
1, when the stock is trading at
$100, she purchases new stock
and covers the short, realizing a
loss of $40. Expecting the stock
to appreciate further, the taxpayer
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purchases additional stock on December 2. As a policy matter, this
transaction does not present the
wash sale abuse. Although the tax
loss is triggered, the taxpayer is
fundamentally changing the economic bet by shifting from short
to long. Even so, technically, Section 1091(a) seems to apply. There
is "loss claimed to have been
sustained from any sale" (i.e., the
short sale), and the taxpayer has
purchased stock a day later." Since
this result makes no sense, the government should clarify (e.g., in a
ruling) that the statute should not
be read in this way.88

IV The Case for
a Stronger Wash
Sale Regime
The prior Part offered eight
reforms that should be uncontroversial: seven perfect end-runs that
should be blocked, and an obvious instance of overbreadth that
should be corrected. The unifying
theme so far is that no deduction
should be allowed if taxpayers
have not changed their economic
position at all-or, at least, not in
a noticeable way.
This Part makes a more controversial argument: Even if taxpayers
do change their economic position in a meaningful way, their
loss should still be disallowed
as long as this change is incomplete. The key question should be
whether material elements of the
old economic return remain. Why
should loss deferral be this broad?
This Part offers two justifications:
first, losses need to be deferred because gains can be deferred quite
easily under current law; second,
a loss deferral rule is counterproductive if taxpayers can avoid it
easily. Drawing on these general
principles, this Part develops a

theory about the proper scope
of the wash sale rules. Happily,
current law already reaches the
correct result in important cases,
but other aspects of current law
need to be changed.
This case for changing current
law is subject to a caveat, though.
There is a risk that the wash sale
regime might never be tough
enough to be effective. Taxpayers
might continue harvesting losses,
while choosing replacement positions that are sufficiently unlike
the loss position. If this would
be a widespread reaction, other
constraints on the timing option
might be preferable, including a
broader capital loss limitation or
more accelerated timing for gains.
A. How Aggressively Should
Our Realization-Based System
Defer Losses?
1. The Parity Goal. In determining how aggressively to defer
losses, policymakers should start
by matching the treatment of losses with the treatment of gains. An
important problem with the timing option, discussed in Part II, is
that the effective tax rate on gains
becomes lower than the effective
tax rate on losses: In other words,
the government shares disproportionately in losses. As a result, the
government loses revenue and the
tax burden on (wealthy) investors
declines. In addition, taxpayers have the incentive to prefer
risky positions ex ante, and to
engage in wasteful tax planning
ex post. To solve these problems,
the government's share of gains
needs to match its share of losses.
This parity goal means that, if taxpayers can easily defer the tax on
gains, their deduction for losses
also should be deferred.
Under current law, deferring
gains is easy for many taxpayers. 89
Gains are not taxed until realiza-
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tion-a step that taxpayers can
choose to delay. If they die holding the investment, their gain will
never be subject to the income tax
because, under current law, heirs
takes property with a fair market
value basis.9" Empirical studies
suggest that this rule spares as
much as 80 percent of capital
gain from income tax.9'
In theory, delaying recognition
of gain comes at a cost: Taxpayers must remain exposed to the
investment's economic return.
In practice, however, wealthy
taxpayers can hedge most of this
economic exposure without triggering tax. They can simulate the
economics of a sale-transferring
economic return and receiving
cash proceeds-while deferring
their tax. In 1997, Congress targeted perfect hedges such as
short sales against the box with the
constructive sale rule of Section
1259. Under this rule, taxpayers
who transfer "substantially all"
of their opportunity for gain
and risk of loss are treated as
selling appreciated property. Yet
taxpayers can still defer tax while
transferring most, but not all,
of their economic exposure. For
example, assume a taxpayer owns
XYZ stock that is worth $100 and
has a zero basis. If he keeps opportunity for gain between $100
and $120, practitioners generally
agree that his tax is deferred. As
I have written elsewhere, these
hedging transactions are relatively
easy for sophisticated taxpayers. 92
Since gains can be deferred even
when taxpayers make significant
changes in their economic return,
losses also should be deferred even
if taxpayers make correspondingly
significant changes.
2. The Effectiveness Goal. In
seeking to defer losses, policy-

makers need to beware of an
important pitfall. The goal has

to be actually stopping loss har-

vesting, and not merely making
this practice modestly harder. Put
another way, the success of loss
limitations depends on whether
taxpayers plan around them. To
see this point, assume that the
wash sale regime is triggered if
taxpayers acquire a replacement
position that perfectly replicates
the loss position, but not if the
replacement position approximately replicates it. This rule
works if taxpayers actually are
deterred from harvesting losses
(e.g., because taxpayers resist even
small changes in economic return). In contrast, the picture is
bleaker if all taxpayers respond
to the rule-not by giving up on
loss harvesting-but by harvesting in a more sophisticated way
(e.g., by accepting small economic changes). In this case, loss
harvesting continues unabated,
but social waste actually increases
as taxpayers face higher costs,
such as economic changes they
do not want.
Obviously, in most cases the
results are not this clear cut.
Some taxpayers give up on planning (the "marginal" ones), while
others press on with more costly
strategies (the "inframarginal"
taxpayers). The key question is
whether efficiency gains from
marginal taxpayers outweigh efficiency costs from inframarginal
taxpayers. To be successful, the
rule needs to raise the costs of loss
harvesting to the point where this
balance becomes favorable (and,
ideally, as favorable as possible)."
To sum up, then, the parity goal
suggests that, if it is easy to defer
gains, losses need to be deferred.
The effectiveness goal adds that,
if the goal is to defer losses, the
system needs to do it effectively.
There is no point in simply making loss harvesting a bit more

difficult; the wash sale regime
actually has to stop the practice in
enough cases.

B. The "Call Spread" Theory:
A Guide for Policymakers
What does this mean for the
wash sale rules? Before turning
to possible statutory language or
concrete applications, the first
step is to begin at the conceptual
level. If losses need to be deferred
as much as gains, one approach
is to coordinate the standard for
wash sales with the standard for
constructive sales. These regimes
define, in the case of a constructive sale, how much a taxpayer's
economic exposure can change
while still deferring gains and,
in the case of a wash sale, how
much it must change in order to
accelerate losses. If Section 1259
makes it easy to defer tax on
gains, Section 1091 should make
it correspondingly difficult to
accelerate deductions for losses.
Keeping even modest exposure to
the depreciated investment should
be enough to defer the loss, if this
exposure is enough to defer gain.
By analogy to Section 1259, then,
the condition for avoiding a wash
sale should be that the seller of
a loss position has to eliminate
substantially all risk of loss and
opportunity for gain in the loss
position for a minimum period
of time.
As noted above, practitioners
generally believe that a taxpayer
who keeps opportunity for gain
between 100 percent and 120
percent of an investment's fair
market value in a three-year hedging transaction (i.e., a 100-120
call spread) has not substantially
eliminated risk of loss and opportunity for gain.94 Just as this level
of economic exposure is enough
to defer gain (i.e., by avoiding
Section 1259), so too should it
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be enough to defer loss (i.e., by
triggering Section 1091). A wash
sale regime should be triggered
if, during the window period,
the seller of a loss position enters into a 100-120 call spread or
some other economic position offering at least as much economic
exposure to the loss position. In
theory, then, there should be a
wash sale for any replacement
position with a "delta" as high
as that of a 100-120 call spread. 9s
This is a very broad test. For
example, it covers most principalprotected exchangeable securities
and call options.
Of course, a test based on delta
is too sophisticated a concept for
many taxpayers to apply, while
"offering as much exposure as a
100-120 call spread" is too mushy
to be a legal standard. Thus, neither
approach is proposed here as the
operative doctrine. The goal here
is not to formulate statutory language, but to determine the right
answer as a matter of policy.

C. Four Doctrinal Applications
What are the "call spread" theory's practical implications? Most
straightforwardly, it justifies an
unpopular aspect of current law.
In addition, the theory supports
various changes in Section 1091.
Some would be easy to administer, while others would be more
difficult. The goal in this Section
is not to offer definitive recommendations, but to survey a menu
of possibilities for policymakers
to consider.
1. Current Law for Options.
Under the "call spread" theory, the
regime should indeed be triggered
when taxpayers replace depreciated
stock with call options that have a
high enough delta. To be precise,
the option has to have a delta as
large as that of a 100 percent-120
percent call spread. As an adminis-
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trability compromise, though, it is
plausible to dispense with the delta
test, finding a wash sale whenever
a call option is purchased in the
window period. This is indeed the
rule under current law.96 Commentators often criticize this result as
overbroad since the option offers
a different economic return than
the stock,97 but the analysis here
shows that current law is appropriate. A contribution of this paper,
then, is to offer a theoretical rationale for this unpopular rule.
This is not to say that the treatment of options under current law
already conforms perfectly to the
"call spread" theory. Two straightforward changes are needed. First,
just as there is a wash sale if an option replaces stock, so too should
there be a wash sale if the reverse
happens-that is, if stock replaces
an option.0 The stock replaces not
just a fraction of the economic return on the option, but all of it
(while obviously adding more).
Second, a wash sale needs to be
triggered when a taxpayer replaces
a short position with a put option (i.e., even though the put does
not perfectly replicate the short
sale)." Current law arguably does
not provide this result. Section
1091(e) would apply if "substantially identical stock or securities
were sold," but here a security (the
put) was purchased, not sold.' 0 Alternatively, Section 1091(e) would
be triggered if "another short sale
... was entered into," but a put is
formally different from a short
sale. There are also economic differences, especially if the put is not
deep in the money.' Guidance is
needed here to clarify that a wash
sale is indeed triggered.
2. Positions in Substantially
Similar or Related Property.
In addition to justifying the current rule for options, the "call
spread" theory also suggests that,

in general, a broad test is needed
to match loss and replacement positions. For example, each of the
following transactions should be
wash sales under this theory, but
may not qualify under current law:
Replacing a mutual fund with a
single-premium variable life insurance contract in which the death
benefit is based on the same fund
(or a so-called "clone" fund);
replacing stock with a so-called
DECS, i.e., a security issued by a
third party that offers most, but
not all, of the stock's economic
return; and replacing stock with
a call option to buy the variable
life insurance or DECS.
There are two ways to cover these
(and similar) transactions. First,
under current law, there would
be a wash sale if the replacement
position qualified as a "contract"
or "option." A broad construction
of these phrases could conceivably
reach these replacement positions,
although it is a particular stretch
for the insurance contract. To
eliminate the need for this creative
reinterpretation, policymakers should consider a statutory
amendment that substitutes the
word "position" for "contract"
and "option." As defined in the
straddle rules, this broader term
means "an interest (including a
futures or forward contract or
option).""' 2 The phrase should
be broad enough to cover the
insurance contract and optionallyexchangeable securities (and, for
that matter, periodic swaps). 3
A second step, which can either
supplement or replace the one
described above, is to jettison the
requirement that replacement and
loss positions have to be "substantially identical." Old authorities
construing this language allow
taxpayers to avoid a wash sale
based on very modest disparities
in credit risk,0 4 economic yield,105
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term to maturity 1"6 and seniority."7 Under these authorities,
the insurance contract probably
isn't substantially identical to the
stock,0° and the DECS may not
be either.0 9 An alternative is the
"substantially similar or related
property" (SSRP) test of Section
246."" This change would ensure
that a wash sale is triggered, for instance, when stock is replaced with
a call option to purchase a DECS
or when one indexed mutual fund
is replaced with another."'
3. Constructively Similar Positions. Thus far, the proposed
reforms are relatively simple. However, they also are broader than the
"call spread" theory requires. For
instance, if an out-of-the-money
call option has a lower delta
than a 100-120 call spread, the
parity goal doesn't require a wash
sale. Can the requisite economic
relationship be specified more pre-,
cisely? The answer is "yes," but the
standard becomes more complex
and harder to administer.
For instance, the Section 1091
standard can be tied explicitly to
Section 1259. To avoid a wash sale,
the seller of a loss position would be
required, by analogy to Section 1259,
to eliminate substantially all the risk
of loss and opportunity for gain in
the loss position for a minimum
period of time. Or, put another
way, a wash sale would be triggered
if a taxpayer acquires a position
that is "constructively similar" to
the loss position during the window
period. Under this approach, the
basic question is whether the taxpayer is retaining enough exposure
(i.e., through the replacement position) to avoid a constructive sale
(i.e., assuming, hypothetically, that
the taxpayer had hedged instead).
If a replacement position gives the
taxpayer enough exposure to avoid
a constructive sale, then it would
trigger a wash sale.

A challenge with this doctrinal
formulation is that it compares
apples and oranges. In one case,
the taxpayer keeps a position and
hedges it, and in the other she
sells the position and replaces it.
How can these two circumstances
be meaningfully compared? To
do so, the seller of a loss position
will have to compare the replacement position to a hypothetical
transaction, which is assumed
to have three properties. First,
instead of selling the loss position, the taxpayer is assumed to
hedge it. Second, the loss position
is assumed to be appreciated (i.e.,
so that Section 1259 can apply).
Third, the hedge is assumed to
leave the taxpayer with as much
retained exposure as is offered in
the replacement position-that is,
the position that the taxpayer has,
in fact, acquired. In other words,
the replacement position is assumed to represent the net return
of the loss position combined
with the hypothetical hedge. The
question, then, is whether this
residual economic return would
be great enough to avoid a constructive sale. If so, this exposure
would be large enough to trigger
a wash sale.
As an example of this (admittedly cumbersome) inquiry, assume
that a taxpayer sells stock worth
$100 at a loss and purchases a call
option with an exercise price of
$100. To see whether this replacement position is "constructively
similar" to the loss position, the
taxpayer must analyze a hypothetical hedging transaction. This
hypothetical hedge must net the
same economic return (i.e., when
combined with the stock) as the
at-the-money call option that the
taxpayer actually purchased as a
replacement position. In this case,
buying an at-the-money put option (and borrowing against the

locked-in value) does the trick (i.e.,
since the net return on stock, a
$100 put option, and a borrowing,
is equivalent to that of a $100 call
option). Since the purchase of an
at-the-money put option does not
trigger a constructive sale, the acquisition of an at-the-money call
option would trigger a wash sale
under the "constructive similarity" approach.
Needless to say, there are administrability hurdles here. For
example, what if the price of the
loss position has changed by the
time the taxpayer acquires the
replacement position? In comparing the economic return on the
loss position with the economic
return on the replacement position, do we value the underlying
as of the date when it is sold? Or
later when the replacement position is acquired?1 2 Even more

fundamentally, this approach to
Section 1091 requires us to apply
our understanding of Section
1259-but, unfortunately, Section
1259 is itself ambiguous on many
key fronts."'
Although the administrability
problems here are serious, there
are two reasons why they should
become easier over time. First,
gaps in Section 1259 ultimately
will be filled as courts decide
cases and the government issues
regulations and rulings. Second,
tying these two standards together
may help keep the government
and taxpayers honest. If they
make aggressive arguments about
one of these standards, it could
backfire on them for the other.
For instance, if taxpayers succeed in narrowing Section 1259,
they would inadvertently expand
Section 1091. Likewise, if the government aggressively broadens the
definition of a constructive sale,
the effect would be to constrict
the wash sale regime.
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4. Baskets. Whether or not
this "constructive similarity"
approach is adopted, a more
effective approach is needed for
finding wash sales when a position based on a basket of stocks
(such as a mutual fund or fund
derivative) replaces either a single
stock or another basket. For example, what if the taxpayer sells
XYZ and buys a derivative based
on a portfolio of stocks that
includes XYZ? Or what if the
taxpayer sells one mutual fund
that includes 20 stocks, and buys
a new mutual fund that includes
some of these stocks (or all of
them, but with a different weighting than the old fund)?
Under current law, taxpayers
make aggressive arguments about
these situations. There certainly
are economic differences between
the loss and replacement positions, at least when they are viewed
as a whole, so they are unlikely
to be "substantially identical."
Of course, the government may
seek to bifurcate the positions,
finding a wash sale to the extent
that components of the loss and
replacement positions match
each other. Yet bifurcation is not
clearly authorized under Section
1091. In response, policymakers
should require bifurcation when
it is administratively feasible. As
under the Section 246 regulations, bifurcation should be the
rule when fewer than 20 stocks
are involved."4
Like in the Section 246 regulations, the focus for larger baskets
should be on the degree of overlap between the two positions. A
caveat, though, is that the Section
246 regulations are too generous
in finding that baskets with less
than 70-percent overlap are not
"substantially similar or related." 5
Since portfolios with 69-percent
overlap still track each other close-

ly, taxpayers game this test. Instead,
a much smaller overlap (e.g, 20 percent to 40 percent) should trigger a
wash sale, consistent with the "call
spread" theory. For instance, when
one actively managed mutual fund
replaces another, there should be
a wash sale if both focus on the
same sector.
Admittedly, a problem with
an overlap test is that portfolios
can track each other without any
overlap. For instance, one portfolio can have GM, Dell and
ExxonMobil, while the other can
have Ford, Gateway and Texaco.
As the portfolio grows, firm-specific risk becomes less important,
while each portfolio reflects the
same industry and market risks."'
In response, a backup rule should
compare the expected return on
the two portfolios. By analogy,
the Section 246 regulations have
an anti-abuse rule that applies
when positions are (1) "reasonably expected to virtually track"
each other and (2) part of a tax
motivated plan."7 By giving clear
guidance about when this sort of
rule applies, the government can
give it teeth. One approach is to
ask whether the positions are
sold or marketed as substitutes
for each other. Another (quite
broad) approach could draw on
the straddle rules: If one portfolio is compared with a short
position in the other (e.g., a short
forward contract), would the two
be a straddle? If so, the anti-abuse
rule would apply."8
Even so, there is at least one
reason why loss deferral is less
important when one mutual
fund replaces another: Because
fund managers focus on pretax
performance, funds are likely to
throw off current gain."' Since the
timing of gains is accelerated, at
least to an extent, the deferral of
losses becomes less important.

D. Caveat: Economic
Exposure Sometimes
Is an Ineffective Friction
So far, this Part has argued for
more aggressive loss deferral, and
has identified ways of pursuing
this goal with the wash sale rules.
Yet this regime has a limitation:
Taxpayers can always accelerate
their deduction if they are willing to make a significant enough
change in their economic return.
The concern, then, is that even
the strengthened version of
Section 1091 advocated here
is not strong enough to be effective in all situations. This
"effectiveness" concern may be
especially serious for diversified
taxpayers, since firm-specific
risk (and, correspondingly, the
omission of a particular firm
from their portfolio during the
window period) is less likely to
be important. Indeed, the very
fact that the loss position has
declined in value suggests that it
has become a less salient part of
the taxpayer's portfolio.
Of course, the point should
not be overstated. Even under
current law, the wash sale rules
discourage some taxpayers from
harvesting losses (e.g., those who
do not have access to the perfect end-runs described above).
By strengthening the regime,
the reforms proposed here will
discourage still more loss harvesting. For instance, a taxpayer who
sells a high-tech mutual fund will
have to buy something completely different (e.g., Treasuries or an
energy fund). Likewise, a taxpayer
with GM will have to replace it
with Ford; yet because the firms
are competitors, there is a risk
that their prices will move in
opposite directions. For many
taxpayers, this is too high a price
to pay. Although some residual
harvesting will surely remain, the
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reforms proposed here are still
advisable as long as the efficiency
gains from marginal taxpayers
who are deterred outweigh the
efficiency losses from inframarginal taxpayers who continue to
plan in a more elaborate way. My
sense is that this balance is likely
to favorable. Even so, there may
be alternatives that strike an even
more favorable balance. While alternatives generally are beyond
this article's scope, a brief look
at two is worthwhile.
1. Broader Capital Loss
Limitation. On "effectiveness" grounds, the capital loss
limitations have an important
potential advantage. Unlike
the wash sale rules, they do not
tie the tax benefit to economic
exposure. To deduct the loss,
taxpayers must recognize taxable
gain. They cannot change this immutable fact by shying away from
their loss position after selling it.
Altering their economic position
does not help. Put another way,
economic exposure does not
serve as a (potentially inadequate)
friction in this regime, as it does
in Section 1091.
How can reformers build
on this advantage? The main
challenge is to shore up the
capital loss limitation's other
weaknesses, some of which
were mentioned briefly above.
For example, as Robert Scarborough has suggested, the
definition of capital gain can
be further refined (e.g., to exclude time value returns). 2 ' In
addition, losses can be deferred
to a greater degree. For instance,
instead of matching a dollar of
recognized losses with the first
dollar of recognized gain, the
loss could be matched with the
last dollar of gain; as under the
straddle rules, losses could be

deferred to the extent of unrecognized gain.' Needless to
say, these modifications pose
difficult administrability and
political issues, but these are
beyond this article's scope.
2. Accelerating Tax on Gain.
Instead of deferring losses, policymakers can also curtail the
timing option by accelerating
gains. Indeed, under a mark-tomarket system, there would be
no need to defer losses at all.
Likewise, even if a realization
system is retained, the wash sale
regime could be more lenient if
the constructive sale regime were
tougher. In theory, a constructive sale could be triggered-not
just when the taxpayer transfers
substantially all of her economic
return-but when she transfers a
relatively modest amount. 122 If
this were the test for gains, the
wash sale regime123 would not need
to be as broad.
In theory, the "effectiveness"
concern could also arise for a
tough constructive sale regime,
since taxpayers can avoid this
regime by holding the appreciated investment unhedged. Yet
effectiveness should be less of a
problem here than with a tough
wash sale regime. The reason is
that a taxpayer with highly appreciated stock is less likely to be
diversified. The appreciated stock
probably has outperformed the
rest of the taxpayer's portfolio,
becoming a disproportionately
large part of it. As a result, holding appreciated stock unhedged
is an uncomfortable way to avoid
a constructive sale. In contrast, a
depreciated position is unlikely to
loom as large within the taxpayer's portfolio, as discussed above,
so omitting it from the portfolio
(i.e., to avoid the wash sale regime)
should not be as unappealing. To

sum up, a tough constructive sale
regime has at least one advantage
over a tough wash sale regime.
Other issues also bear on this
comparison, but lie beyond this

article's scope.124

V Conclusion
The wash sale rules are too porous. Sophisticated taxpayers are
deducting losses without changing
their economic position at all. In
response, the government should
clarify that these perfect end-runs
are unavailable. At a minimum,
taxpayers should not be allowed
to deduct losses if they have made
essentially no change in their economic position.
This article also makes a more
controversial claim: Because it
is so easy to defer gains, even
when taxpayers make significant
changes in their economic exposure, it must be correspondingly
difficult to accelerate losses. In
theory, loss should be deferred
whenever taxpayers acquire a replacement position with a delta
as great as a 100-120 call spread.
This theory justifies an aspect of
current law that has been widely
criticized: In fact, replacing stock
with a call option should trigger
a wash sale. In this spirit, a number of other reforms are also
proposed, including the need for
a wash sale when a put option
replaces a short sale, when equity-linked life insurance replaces
the underlying equity, and when
one sector-specific mutual fund
replaces another. Needless to say,
these various reforms are not
perfect, and it is worth looking
for better alternatives. Yet in the
absence of fundamental reform,
narrow incremental remedies are
all have. We need to do the best
we can with them.
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box, total return equity swaps, forward
contracts and other transactions having substantially the same effect. For a
discussion, see David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning,
101 COLUM. L. REV.1312 (2001).
In a call spread, a taxpayer buys a call
(e.g., with a $100 exercise price) and
sells a call (e.g., with a $120 exercise
price). The taxpayer thus earns a return
as the underlying appreciates above
the lower bound (e.g., $100) but stops
earning an additional return once the
underlying property's value exceeds the
upper bound (e.g., $120).
See, e.g., Erika W. Nijenhuis, Wash
Sale Rules Then and Now, TAXES,Mar.
2004, at 181.
10 A put option is an option to sell the
underlying property for a specified exercise price during a specified period.
Code Sec. 1091(a) ("In the case of any
loss claimed to have been sustained
from any sale or other disposition of
shares of stock or securities where it
appears that, within a period beginning
30 days before the date of such sale or
disposition and ending 30 days after
such date, the taxpayer has acquired
(by purchase or by an exchange on
which the entire amount of gain or
loss was recognized by law), or has
entered into a contract or option so to
acquire, substantially identical stock or
securities, then no deduction shall be
allowed under section 165 ... ").
2 Code Sec. 1091(d) ("If the property
consists of stock or securities the acquisition of which (or the contract or
option to acquire which) resulted in the
nondeductibility (under this section or
corresponding provisions of prior internal revenue laws) of the loss from the
sale or other disposition of substantially
identical stock or securities, then the
basis shall be the basis of the stock or
securities so sold or disposed of, increased or decreased, as the case may
be, by the difference, if any, between
the price at which the property was
acquired and the price at which such
substantially identical stock or securities
were sold or otherwise disposed of").
13 Code Sec. 1223(4) ("In determining the
period for which the taxpayer has held
stock or securities the acquisition of which
(or the contract or option to acquire
which) resulted in the nondeductibility
(under Section 1091 relating to wash
sales) of the loss from the sale or other
disposition of substantially identical stock
or securities, there shall be included the
period for which he held the stock or
securities the loss from the sale or other
disposition of which was not deductible");
see also Reg. §1.1223-1 (d).

What if the purchase price paid for the
replacement position diverges from the
sale price received for the loss position? To account for these differences,
Section 1091 (d) also provides an adjustment to the replacement position's
basis. See Code Sec. 1091 (d).
If the taxpayer makes more than one
15
sale of depreciated property within a
tax year, the wash sale regime applies
chronologically. According to Reg.
§1.1091 -1 (b), the regime "shall be applied to the losses in the order in which
the stock or securities the disposition of
which resulted in the respective losses
were disposed of (beginning with the
earliest disposition)."
16
Thus, if more property is sold than
purchased-such that the loss position is larger than the replacement
position-losses are disallowed with
respect to the loss position that was
acquired first. Reg. §1 .1091-1(c).
Correspondingly, if more property is
acquired than sold-such that the
replacement position is larger than
the loss position-the new property
that was acquired earliest (and thus
is the least new) is credited with extra
basis and holding period under Section
1091. Reg. §1.1091 -1(d).
17
In a Roth IRA, taxpayers invest after-tax
dollars and earn a tax-free yield.
Code Sec. 1014. Along with the estate
tax, Section 1014 is scheduled for repeal in 2010 but is scheduled to be
reinstated the following year.
19 See generally Shaviro, supra note 3. As
the term "efficiency" is used here, taxes
are "efficient" if taxpayers pay them
without changing their behavior.
For example, consider a coin toss in which
a taxpayer pays $100 if he wins and receives $100 if he losses. This bet has zero
fair market value (assuming the coin is
fair). A 50-percent tax will not affect this
fair market value (assuming there is no
timing option and losses are fully deductible), and merely reduces the bet's volatility (so the taxpayer wins or losses $50,
instead of $100). But what if a timing
option reduces the government's share of
gains to 25 percent (i.e., because of tax
deferral), while keeping the government's
share of losses at 50 percent? The bet
yields $75 after tax if the taxpayer wins,
costs only $50 after tax if he loses, and
thus has a fair market value of $12.50.
2
See generally Shaviro, supra note 3.
The normative premise here is that, to
the extent possible, the tax law should
be neutral as to risk. While some types
of risk-taking have positive externalities,
including research and development,
narrowly targeted subsidies should be
used for this purpose.
14
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See generally Shaviro, supra note 3.
For example, high-risk projects may re-

ceive funding even if they have negative
net present value.
24 See generally Schizer, supro note 7.
25 See generally Louis Kaplow, Optimal
Taxation with Costly Enforcement and
Evasion, 43 J. PUB.ECON. 221, 233
(1990) (emphasizing tradeoff between
marginal and inframarginal taxpayers);
Daniel N. Shaviro, Economic Substance,
Corporate Tax Shelters, and the Compaq Case, 88 TAXNOTES 221, 223
(2000) (same); Joel Slemrod and Shomo Yitzhaki, The Costs of Taxation and
the Marginal Efficiency Cost of Funds,
43 INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFFPAPERS
1 72,
179-82 (1996) (describing potential
social waste from tax reforms).
Ironically, a high nominal tax rate
can intensify this effect, increasing the
government's share of losses without
correspondingly increasing its share
of gains.
27 Admittedly, some commentators do defend the realization rule on normative
grounds, but they are in the minority.
See, e.g., Edward Zelinsky, For Realization: The Virtue of Attainable Virtues, 19
CARDOZO L. REV.861 (1997).
28 See Code Sec. 1211. For other constraints that are beyond this article's
scope, see supra note 4.
29 In any event, empirical evidence from
earlier bull markets suggests that large
pools of capital losses are fairly uncommon among individual taxpayers. They
tend to use these losses eventually, and
are seldom left with losses they never
deduct. See ALAN J. AUERBACH ET AL.,
CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION AND TAXAvoIDANCE: NEW EVIDENCE FROM PANELDATA, IN
DOES ATLAS SHRUG? 355 (Joel Slemrod

21

Ed. 2000).
Entrepreneurs can repackage returns to
effort by paying themselves below-market salaries and earning capital gains
on their stock. Analogous strategies
are used when startups are funded by
venture capitalists. See Ronald J. Gilson
and David M. Schizer, Understanding
Venture Capital Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock,
116 HARv. L. REV.
874 (2003). Likewise,
taxpayers look for strategies to convert
interest income to capital gain. See
Code Sec. 1258 (targeting so-called
"conversion" transactions). Even without these aggressive strategies, capital
gain includes an interest-type return
when taxpayers part with the use of their
money, since a portion of their profit is
for time value as opposed to risk. See
generally Scarborough, supra note 3.
Portions of this discussion are drawn
from DAVID M. SCHIZER, THE TAXATION OF
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FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS: SPECIAL RULES(BNA

Tax Management Portfolio) (forthcoming 2004). Readers desiring a more
detailed discussion should consult the
BNA portfolio.
32 See, e.g., S.H. Knox, 33 BTA 972, Dec.
9210 (1936) (declining to find wash
sale when taxpayers sell stock and
acquire interests in private corporation that serves as holding company
for this same stock); W.P Doyle, CA-7,
61-1 USTC 9237, 286 F2d 654 (1961)
(wash sale rules not triggered when taxpayer used a short sale to hedge a replacement position that he purchased
before the window period began); for
a discussion of Doyle, see infro note 49
and accompanying text; D.E. Gantner,
91 TC 713 (1988), off'd, CA-8, 90-2
USTC 50,335, 905 F2d 241 (finding
that regime did not apply when option
was sold at a loss and replaced with
another option during window period);
for a discussion of Gantner, see infra
note 39 and accompanying text.
It is worth adding that these strategies
generally are hard to identify on audit.
The loss is real, since the taxpayer does
indeed sell an investment at a loss. The
auditor thus will need to ask the right
questions about whether a replacement
positions has been acquired. Even if
the transaction is audited, taxpayers
have a good chance of avoiding penalties. They have a plausible technical
argument, so the government might
be expected to waive penalties in a
settlement. The bottom line is that
many taxpayers are tempted to play
the "audit lottery." For a discussion of
this familiar tax-planning dynamic, see
Joseph Bankman, The New Market in
Corporate Tax Shelters, 83 TAXNOTES
1775 (1999).
Consider a landlord whose building
declines in value. It is difficult to deduct
this loss if the landlord wants to keep
the building. Since it is not fungible,
the landlord cannot simply replace it
with an identical one, as he could, for
instance, with something that is publicly traded. In theory, he could sell the
building to his daughter, but other rules
disallow losses in related-party transactions. Alternatively, the landlord might
try to sell the building and immediately
buy it back. Yet with nonfungible property, the law of ownership is likely to
keep him from claiming this loss, since
he will not be parting with the economic
benefits and burdens of ownership.
Thus, the regime properly extends to
residual interests in real estate mortgage investment conduits (REMICs),
Section 860F(d)(1 ), ownership interests
in a Financial Asset Securitization Invest-

ment Trusts (FASITs), Section 860L(f)(1),
single-stock security futures, Section
1091 (f) and GNMA mortgage participotion certificates, GCM 39,551, Aug.
26, 1986 (concluding that GNMA certificates are securities because prices
are quoted daily, and so taxpayers
could easily sell one and buy another
to trigger a loss that has no economic
consequences). It probably also extends to Treasury bill futures; see GCM
38,369, Dec. 3, 1980 (concluding
that Treasury bill futures are securities
because they are direct alternatives to
investing in Treasury bills, which clearly
are securities), although some commentators regard this GCM as suspect. See,
e.g., ANDREA KRAMER,FINANCIAL PRODUCTS
TAXATION, REGULATION, AND DESIGN, at 2916 to 29-17 (3d ed. 2002 Supp.). The
omission of commodities is discussed in
Part I.F, infra.
36 Derivatives obviously are
liquid if
traded on public exchanges. Overthe-counter instruments are also
liquid, since securities dealers profit
by keeping clients happy, and thus
are likely to help them defer gains
and accelerate losses. Since securities
dealers mark their customer positions
to market, they incur no tax cost in accommodating customer preferences as
to timing. See David M. Schizer, Sticks
and Snakes: Derivatives and Curtailing
Aggressive Tax Planning, 73 S. CAL. L.
REV.1339, 1367 (2000).
Compare Code Secs. 351(e), 475(c)(2)
and 731 (c)(2) (explicitly mentioning
forward contracts, notional principal
contracts, and derivatives generally)
with Code Secs. 1 65(g)( 2 ), 1083(f) and
1236(c) (no explicit reference to derivatives). Note that Section 1236(c)'s
definition includes an "evidence of an
interest in" stock, a phrase that arguably is broad enough to include derivatives. For a good discussion of this
issue, see Lucy W. Farr and Michael S.
Farber, Dirty Linen: Airing Out the Wash
Sale Rules, J. TAx'N OF FIN. PRODUCTS,
Summer 2002, at 33.
38 For instance, in holding that corn futures contracts are not securities, the
Tax Court offered a broad rationale
that seems to reach swaps and forwards as well:
All executory contracts giving
a person the right to demand
and receive property upon the
payment of a contract price are
not to be regarded as securities
within the meaning of [the wash
sale rules]. It isapparent ... that
such a future is not a security in
any generally recognized sense
but simply a contract between
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two parties in which one agrees
to supply at a designated time
in the future a stated quantity
and quality of goods, upon
payment of a stated price and
on which a part of the contract price, called a margin,
has been paid by the buyer
to his broker to bind him until
the sale is consummated orthe
contract is sold.
Corn Products Refining Co., 16 TC
395, 399-400, Dec. 18,127 (1951),
66,082,
aff'd, CA-2, 54-2 USTC
215 F2d 513 (1954), aff'd on other
grounds, SCt, 55-2 USTC 9746, 350
US 46, 76 SCt 20 (1955). But see
Trenton Cotton Seed Oil Co., CA-6,
45-1 USTC 9163, 147 F2d 33 (concluding that a commodities future is a
security).
'9 See Gantner, 91 TC 713 (1988), supro
note 32.
40 This language was added by Act
Sec.
5075 of the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 (PL.
100-647), 102 Stat. 3342 (1988).
41
For example, assume that on January
1, the taxpayer enters into the "long"
position on an equity swap that is
based on the value of 100 shares
of XYZ. In economic effect, the swap
causes the taxpayer to feel as if he has
purchased the underlying shares with
borrowed money. Thus, every quarter,
the taxpayer either (1) owes a payment
based on any decline in the value of
the XYZ shares during the quarter or (2)
is entitled to a payment based on any
increase in the value of XYZ shares during the quarter. In addition the taxpayer
owes a quarterly payment based on
prevailing interest rates and is entitled
to a payment based on any dividends
paid with respect to the XYZ shares.
Thus, every quarter, the taxpayer either
makes or receives a single payment,
which is the "net" of the various payments described above. On December
30, after XYZ shares have declined
during the quarter, the taxpayer pays
a third party to take over the swap,
thus realizing a loss. The next day, the
taxpayer enters into a substantially
identical swap contract.
42 These advisors concede that a swap
is essentially no different from a cashsettled forward contract if the swap
accounts for fluctuations in the underlying through a single payment at
maturity, rather than through periodic
payments.
For example, a government ruling
declines to treat notional principal
contract as a series of cash settled
forward contracts in determining the
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character of periodic payments. LTR
9730007 (Apr. 10, 1997). Likewise,
the timing rules for notional principal
contracts under Reg. §446-3 diverge
from the simpler timing rules applicable
to forward contracts. In addition, Section 1259 applies (slightly) different
tests to notional principal contracts
and contracts to acquire. Compare
Code Sec. 1259(d)(3) with Code
Sec. 1259(d)(4). Indeed, a number of
provisions refer to notional principal
contracts as instruments distinct from
forward contracts. See, e.g., Code Sec.
351(e)(1)(B)(ii); Code Sec 475(c)(2);
Code Sec. 731(c)(2)(C); Code Sec.
956(c)(2)(j); Code Sec. 1233(h)(1).
44 In Rev. Rul. 85-87, the government ruled
that selling an in-the money put option
would trigger the wash sale rules when
there was "no substantial likelihood
that the put would not be exercised."
Although the put is not a contract to
acquire in form, "the put sold by A is in
substance a contract to acquire stock."
Rev. Rul. 85-87, 1985-1 CB 268 (June
24, 1985). Cf. G.I.C. Corp., DC Fl.,
96-2 USTC 50,400 (S.D. Fla. 1996),
aff'd on other grounds, CA-11, 97-2
USTC 50,672, 121 F3d 1447 (1997)
(finding that taxpayer that sold stock and
then sold a put option did not trigger
a wash sale; facts of the case do not
describe strike price of put option).
4
There are two unimportant differences.
First, a swap offers complete leverage.
The taxpayer does not put any cash
down, and thus feels as if he has purchased stock with 100 percent borrowed funds. But why should a difference in leverage affect whether the wash
sale rules are triggered? Indeed, under
current law, a wash sale is triggered if
a taxpayer purchases a new share during the window period-whether or not
the taxpayer borrows money to do so.
Second, a swap exposes the taxpayer
to counterparty credit risk. Yet in the
usual case, where the counterparty is
a securities dealer with a strong credit,
this risk is economically unimportant.
See infro Part III.E.
46 The tax loss at issue here will be $20,
regardless of the share price on the day
the short sale is closed. The loss is the
difference between (1) the $50 purchase price of securities used to cover
the short sale and (2) the $30 of sale
proceeds received when securities were
sold initially (at the same time that they
were borrowed). The share price at the
time the short sale is covered does not
figure into the analysis.
The taxpayer starts out owning one
share of stock. On September 29, the
taxpayer buys a second share (which
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increases the exposure) and shorts
a share (which correspondingly decreases the exposure), leaving the
taxpayer, economically, as the owner
of a single share. After the short sale
is covered, moreover, only a single
share remains.
Reg. §1.1233-1(a); Rev. Rul. 73-524,
1973-2 CB 307. The constructive sale
rule of Section 1259 is an exception to
this general rule. It has no application to
the facts here because the stock already
owned by the taxpayer on the date of
the short sale is not appreciated.
The regulation thus overrides W.P
Doyle, CA-7, 61 -1 USTC 9237, 286
F2d 654 (1961), which found the wash
sale rules to be inapplicable on similar facts. Reg. §1.1091 1(g) provides,
"For purposes of determining under this
section the 61-day period applicable
to a short sale of stock or securities,
the principles of paragraph (a) of §
1.1233-1 for determining the consummation of a short sale shall generally
apply except that the date of entering
into the short sale shall be deemed to
be the date of sale if, on the date of
entering into the short sale, the taxpayer owns (or on or before such date
has entered into a contract or option
to acquire) stock or securities identical
to those sold short and subsequently
delivers such stock or securities to close
the short sale."
The wash sale rules still apply, moreover, if the short is covered with
newly-acquired shares, instead of with
depreciated property. For instance, assume again that a taxpayer owns one
depreciated share with a basis of $50
and, on September 29, purchases a
second share for $30 and sells a share
short. Unlike in the above example,
however, the taxpayer does not use the
depreciated share to cover the short.
Instead, on November 2, the taxpayer
buys a share at the market price (e.g.,
for $30, assuming the market price has
not changed), and uses this newly-acquired share to cover the short. On the
same day, the taxpayer also sells the
depreciated share for the market price,
realizing a loss. On these facts, Reg.
§1.1091 l(g) does not apply, since
the taxpayer does not "subsequently
delive[r] such [depreciated] stock or
securities to close the short sale." But
Section 1091 (a) should apply because
the taxpayer is selling the depreciated
stock on the same day that he is buying
new stock to cover the short (i.e., on
November 2).
Taxpayers sometimes offer another
technical argument to avoid a wash
sale: Since the loss is incurred on a
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short sale (i.e., when the depreciated
shares are used to cover the short),
it is argued, the special wash sale
rule for short sales, Section 1091 (e),
should govern. Yet this special rule
finds a wash sale only when a short
sale is paired with either a second short
sale or with a sale of stock-and, evidently, not when a short sale is paired
with a purchase of stock. See Code
Sec.] 091 (e) (disallowing loss on short
sale if, within window period, "(1)
substantially identical stock or securities were sold, or (2) another short
sale of (or securities future contract
to sell) substantially identical stock or
securities was entered into"). Here, of
course, the near-in-time transaction is
a purchase. In response, though, the
government might assert that the loss
is disallowed, not under the special
rule for short sales in Section 1091 (e),
but under the general rule of Section
1091(a). The language of Section
1091(a) should be broad enough to
cover a short sale. See Section 109 1 (a)
("In the case of any loss claimed to
have been sustained from any sole or
other disposition of shares of stock or
securities ... " (emphasis added).
There are two adverse consequences
if the swap is deemed to be a "short
sale" for purposes of Section 1091. Not
only could Reg. §1.1091-1(g) apply,
but Section 1091 (e) could also apply
if the swap is terminated at a loss. If so,
a short sale would be terminated at a
loss (i.e., the termination of the swap on
November 2), and substantially identical stocks or securities would be sold
within the window period (i.e., the sale
of depreciated stock on November 2).
Although a short sale is formally different from a swap, the two obviously
are economically similar. As a technical
matter, is there authority for construing
the term "short sale" broadly? Under
Section 1233(b), which addresses the
tax treatment of short sales, a "short sale"
is defined to include a put option. This
language might be an avenue by which
the government seeks to read the term
"short sale" as including other derivatives.
See also Hoover Co., 72 TC 206, Dec.
36,032 (1 979) (treating "short" currency forward contract as "short sale"
for purposes of Section 1233). The taxpayer might respond that this definition
in Section 1233(b) is expressly limited in
scope, applying only "[flor purposes of
this subsection [1 233(b)]"-and, it is argued, not for purposes of Section 1091.
Yet this argument is somewhat weakened
by the fact that Reg. § 1.1091-1 (g) draws
on the principles of Section 1233 and
applies them (with a modification) in the
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wash sale context. See Reg. §1.1091-1 (g)
(noting that "the principles of paragraph
(a) of § 1.1233-1 for determining the consummation of a short sale shall generally
apply except that the date of entering into
the short sale share be deemed to be
the date of sale" if certain conditions are
satisfied). But even ifthe swap isa "short
sale" for these purposes, the taxpayer
has a further technical argument. The
regulation applies only if the taxpayer
"subsequently delivers such [depreciated]
stock or securities to close the short sale,"
something that obviously would not be
the case in a cash-settled swap.
The government might question the
business purpose of purchasing stock
and entering into a short swap on the
same day. But what if the two steps are
separated by a few hours-or, for that
matter, by two days?
Rev. Rul. 59-418 addresses similar facts,
except that the taxpayer hedges with a
forward contract instead of a swap. The
ruling disallows the loss by treating the
stock as if it is sold on the date on which
the forward contract is initiated (i.e., September 29, in the above example), and
not on the date that the shares ultimately
are delivered (i.e., November 2, in the
above example). According to the ruling, ")tJhe taxpayer, as of [the date on
which the forward contract was entered
into], owned specific shares which he
intended to sell. Moreover, such intent
was subsequently confirmed by the delivery of those shares. On [the date on
which the forward contract was entered
into], his obligation became fixed. His
loss was then realized, for he had
transferred his equitable interests in the
stock." Rev. Rul. 59-418, 1959-2 CB
184. Tax advisors distinguish this ruling,
though, because it involves a forward
contract instead of a swap. They also
argue that it should be read narrowly (or
disregarded entirely) because its analysis
of the law of ownership is out of step with
other precedents; entering into a forward
contract to sell fungible property is not
usually considered a sale of such property under common law. See Rev. Rul.
2003-7, IRB 2003-5, 363 (finding no
constructive sale where taxpayer enters
into variable delivery forward contract);
see generally Edward D. Kleinbard, Risky
and Riskless Positions in Securities, 71
TAXES
783 (1993).
s6 The government might claim that
the newly-purchased share was not
purchased, in substance, until the
swap was terminated. In other words,
the purchase date should be viewed,
for purposes of Section 1091, as
November 2, instead of September
29. If so, the sale of the depreciated

property and the purchase of the new
share would be deemed to occur on
the same day (i.e., November 2). In
other words, even if the government
fails to establish that the loss position
has been sold on the earlier date, the
government can argue, in the alternative, that the replacement property has
not been purchased until the later date.
As support for this tolling of new property's holding period until the equity
swap is settled, the government might
invoke the holding period rule under
the straddle rules. Cf. Proposed Reg.
§1.1092(d)-2(d)(ii) (example) (treating a swap and stock as a straddle).
Under Temporary Reg. §1.1092(b)-2T,
"the holding period of any position that
is part of a straddle shall not begin
earlier than the date the taxpayer no
longer holds ... an offsetting position
with respect to that position." However,
although the straddle rules clearly toll
holding period for purposes of computing capital gains, it is not clear that the
straddle rules toll holding period for
purposes of the wash sole rules.
See Code Sec. 1091(d).
18
See Reg. §1.1091-1(d) ("Where the
amount of stock or securities acquired
within the 61 -day period is not less
than the amount of stock or securities sold or otherwise disposed of,
then the particular shares of stock
or securities the acquisition of which
resulted in the nondeductibility of the
loss shall be those with which the stock
or securities disposed of are matched
in accordance with the following rule:
The stock or securities sold or otherwise
disposed of will be matched with an
equal number of the shares of stock or
securities acquired in accordance with
the order of acquisition (beginning with
the earliest acquisition) of the stock or
securities acquired").
'9 While the regulatory language looks
to which position is "acquired" first,
the term "acquired" should include the
acquisition of an option. In other words,
the relevant acquisition date should be
the purchase-and not the exercise-of
the option. See Reg. § 1.1091-1 (f) ("The
word 'acquired' as used in this section
means acquired by purchase or by an
exchange upon which the entire amount
of gain or loss was recognized by law,
and comprehends cases where the taxpayer has entered into a contract or option within the 61 -day period to acquire
by purchase or by such an exchange").
c) There is a possible glitch in this argument, though. Some advisors read Section 1091 (d) to say that, if an option
triggers a wash sale, the basis from the
loss position does not go directly into
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the option; rather, it goes to the stock
or securities acquired with the option.
Under this reading, the option does not
inherit the basis from the depreciated
stock, and thus the taxpayer cannot deduct this loss when the option expires. I
am indebted to Erika Nijenhuis for this
observation.
61 See Code Sec. 1234(a)(2) ("[lf loss
is attributable to failure to exercise an
option, the option shall be deemed to
have been sold or exchanged on the
62

63

day it expired").
Another technical issue iswhether lapse
of an option qualifies as a "sale or other disposition" under Section 1091 (a).
Section 1234(a)(2) can be read to give
an affirmative answer, providing that
a lapsed option "shall be deemed to
have been sold or exchanged on the
day it expired." Yet this argument is
undermined, to an extent, by the fact
that Section 1234(a)(2) begins with the
qualifier "[flor purposes of paragraph
(1)." Paragraph (1) relates to the character of gain or loss on an option.
There is an asymmetry in applying the
"substantially identical" test to stock
and options. According to Rev, Rul.
56-406:
If an individual taxpayer, who
is not a dealer in stocks or
securities, sells common stock
of a corporation at a loss and
simultaneously purchases warrants for common stock of the
same corporation, the loss is
not allowable by reason of
section 1091 (a) of the [Code].
If the taxpayer sells stock warrants of a corporation at a loss
and simultaneously purchases
common stock of the same corporation, the loss is allowable
unless the relative values and
price changes are so similar as
to make the warrants fully convertible securities and therefore
substantially identical with the
shares of common stock.
1956-2 CB 523; see also GCM
39,036, Sept. 16, 1983 (rejecting
proposition that wash sale is always
triggered when taxpayer sells a warrant at a loss and purchases stock
within window period). In contrast, if
stock is sold at a loss, and an option is
purchased, the option and the stock do
not have to be substantially identical.
See Section 1091(a) (finding a wash
sale if, first, there is "any sale or other
disposition of shares of stock" and, second, within the wash sale period the
taxpayer has "entered into a contract
or option so to acquire" substantially
identical stock and securities). Thus, in
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the sale-of-stock scenario, what matters is the option's underlying property,
and not the option itself.
Although there may be room to
read the language differently, the last
sentence of Section 1091(a) should
not change this result, even though it
was added after the above ruling was
issued. This last sentence treats options
as "stock or securities." Thus, if an option issold at a loss, the wash sale rules
apply if substantially identical "stock
or securities"-read options-are
acquired. The regime also could be
triggered by a contract or option to acquire the relevant underlying property,
but in this case the relevant underlying
is the option itself; so this trigger seems
to be an option to buy a substantially
identical option.
64 Thus, if the taxpayer has 1 ,000
shares of depreciated stock, he can
clearly claim the loss by purchasing
an additional 1,000 shares-and thus
holding 2,000 shares-during the 30
days before he sells the depreciated
stock. So why shouldn't he be able to
purchase 1 ,000 economically "real"
options-so that he holds 1,000
options and 1 ,000 shares-for 30
days? If the options are economically
substantial, the taxpayer is doubling
up in much the same way as if he'd
purchased extra stock.
65 A broader alternative is to change the
ordering rule of Reg. §1.1091-1(d).
Instead of treating the first replacement position as the one that triggers
the wash sale-regardless of whether
this position is an option or stock-the
rule could give priority to "delta-one"
positions (such as stock, forward contracts, and swaps) over options. In other
words, if any stock, forward contracts or
swaps are acquired during the window
period, the first of these to be acquired
would trigger the wash sale (even if an
option was acquired first). Thus, options
would trigger wash sales only if no
stock, forward contracts or swaps were
acquired during the window period;
in this scenario, the first option to be
acquired would trigger the wash sale.
At the same time that the government
clarifies this regulation, they should
also clarify that, if an option triggers a
wash sale, it should inherit basis from
the loss position. As noted above, some
advisers believe the status of this basis
is unclear. See supra note 60.
66
Section 1091(e) provides: "Rules
similar to the rules of subsection (a)
shall apply to any loss realized on the
closing of a short sale of ...stock or
securities if, within a period beginning
30 days before the date of such closing

and ending 30 days after such date (1)
substantially identical stock or securities
were sold, or (2) another short sale of
...
substantially identical stock or securities was entered into."
67 Section 1091 (e) also covers a straddletype transaction similar to the abuse
targeted by Section 1092. Assume that
on January 1 a taxpayer purchases a
share of stock and simultaneously
shorts the stock. As a result, the taxpayer has two perfectly offsetting positions.
Over the course of the year, the stock
appreciates, giving the taxpayer a loss
on the short sale and a corresponding
gain on the long (i.e., the stock the
taxpayer owns). On December 31, the
taxpayer buys new stock and closes out
the short sale at a loss. On January
1, the taxpayer sells the appreciated
long position. The taxpayer obviously
would like to claim the loss this year,
while putting off the gain until next
year. Yet Section 1091 (e)(1) defers the
loss. The taxpayer has covered a short
at a loss and, within the wash sale
period, "substantially identical stock
or securities were sold." See James W.
Wetzler, The Tax Treatment of Securities
Transactions Under the Tax Reform Act
of 1984, 25 TAx NOTES 453, 469-70,
472-73 (Oct. 29, 1984).
61
In response, the government might
invoke Section 1233(b), which treats
certain put options as short sales. Assuming this principle of Section 1233
extends to Section 1091 -a controversial proposition, as noted above, see
supro note 53-the government would
then have to show that over-the-counter derivatives qualify as put options for
purposes of Section 1233. Cf. Hoover
Co., supra note 53 ("short" foreign currency contracts treated as short sales
for purposes of Section 1233).
69 There is authority that short call options
cannot be "acquired." See, e.g., TAM
7730002 (Apr. 14, 1977) (Section
1091 does not apply when option
grantor terminates an option because
grantor does not "acquire" property);
LTR 8517029 (Jan. 29, 1985) (Section 1234, not Section 1091, provides
rule when option grantor terminates
call option). Yet a possible distinction
is that a short call option can only
be a liability, generating losses as
the stock price rises, but not making
money, other than the premium, as the
stock price falls. While a short forward
contract or short equity swap can be
a liability if the stock price rises, these
contracts also can prove to be assets
if the stock price falls.
76 See Code Sec. 1091 (a).
71 I thank Enka Nijenhuis for this observation.
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In addition to Section 1091, where
this standard is not defined, the
phrase "substantially identical" also
is used in the rules for short sales
under Section 1233, which prevent
taxpayers from aging property while
at the same time shorting "substantially identical" property. According to
Reg. §1.1233-1(d)(1), which defines
the term, the phrase generally has the
same meaning in both contexts. Reg.
§1.1233-1 (d)(1) ("In general, as applied to stocks or securities, the term
has the same meaning as the term
substantially identical stock or securities used in section 1091, relating to
wash sales of stocks or securities").
See also Rev. Rul. 77-201, 1977-1
CB 250 (noting that Reg. §1 .12331(d) "defin[es] the term 'substantially
identical property' for purposes of section 1091 of the Code"). Likewise, the
test is used in the regime governing the
dividends- received-deduction, in which
taxpayers are barred from claiming this
benefit if they hedge with a position in
"substantially identical" property. Code
Sec. 246(c)(4).
See M. Hanlin, CA-3, 39-2 USTC
19783, 108 F2d 429 (1939), aff' g ,
38 BTA 811 (1938). In Hanlin, the taxpayer replaced bonds of the Federal
Land Bank of Louisville with bonds of
the Federal Land Banks of St. Louis and
Wichita. The formal difference in issuers was deemed immaterial, since the
various land banks were "all under the
supervision of one central authority,"
the U.S. Form Credit Administration,
and since the banks were "at least secondarily liable on each other's bonds."
Id., at 430-31. Rather, the key difference in these bonds, which rendered
them not substantially identical, was
that they were backed by different
collateral-in one case, mortgages
on Louisville farms, and, in the other,
mortgages on Wichita farms: "Though
the average sense of the obligation
may well be the same, even an economist must recognize, by geographical
definition, a salient divergence in, say
the type (and marketability) of crops
produced-or, perhaps, the likelihood
of dust storms," the court said. "This
difference, we think, deprives the bonds
of one Land Bank of substantial identity with those of another." Id., at 431.
Compare TAM 8641004 (June 30,
1986) (GNMA certificates considered
substantially identical, notwithstanding
differences in underlying mortgage
pools, because average properties of
pools tend to be the same).
In Rev. Rul. 59-44, 1959-1 CB 205,
bonds of certain local housing authori-
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ties were replaced by bonds of other
housing authorities, but all these housing authorities had some degree of credit
support from a central federal housing
authority. The question was whetherthis
federal authority was "common primary
obligor on all the bonds involved," such
that the bonds should be treated as, in
effect, having a single issuer. The ruling
concluded that the formal differences
in the issuers had economic substance,
and that the federal backstopping role
was incomplete, largely because the
federal guarantee did not apply to the
extent that income from the underlying
collateral (i.e., rental properties) was
adequate to cover payments owed to
bond investors: "[T]he local authorities
have very substantial credit standings of
their own ...
in view of their ownership
of the housing projects and the requirement that the net revenues derived
therefrom become a part of the debt
service fund," the ruling noted. In addition, "the various local authorities are
separate political entities unassociated
with each other and with no secondary
liability with respect to each other's
bonds," a fact that distinguished the
ruling from Hunlin. Id. Compare TAM
8641004 (June 30, 1986) (GNMA
certificates considered substantially
identical, notwithstanding differences
in underlying mortgage pools, because
average properties of pools tend to be
the same).
75 As a result, the question whether
a wash
sale should be triggered depends on
the question of how strong the regime
ought to be-that is, how readily the
system should disallow losses. This
general issue is considered in Part IV,
although the treatment of debt is beyond this article's scope.
76 For a discussion of securities
futures,
see Erika W. Nijenhuis, New Tax Rules
for Securities Futures Contracts Enacted,
14 J.TAx'N FIN. INST.4, 117-18 (May/
une 2001).
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Very minor differences in economic
return are possible. The funds may
have different fee structures. In addition, they may be more or less prompt
in adjusting to changes in the underlying index.
Instead of conceptualizing this as
credit risk, we might also view it as
firm-specific risk in a context where
firm-specific risk is unimportant. In
any event, there is old authority that
such differences are enough to defeat
a wash sale. See S.H. Knox, 33 BTA
972 (1936) (declining to find a wash
sale when taxpayers sell stock and
acquire interests in corporation that
serves as holding company for such

stock because "[t]he separateness of
a corporation and its stockholders can
not be disregarded for this purpose").
But cf. Security First Nat'l Bank of Los
Angeles, 28 BTA 289, 313-15 (1933)
(deeming wash sale regime to apply
when a trust controlled by the selling
taxpayer repurchased the securities).
'9 Admittedly, this difference is becoming
somewhat more significant as regulators
investigate (and fine) some funds, but
not others, for trading improprieties.
0 See Rev. Rul. 71-568, 1971-2 CB 312
(concluding that Section 1091 does not
apply to commodity futures); GCM
34630, Oct. 4, 1971. In drawing this
conclusion, the IRS declined to follow
Trenton Cotton Seed Oil Co., CA-6,
45-1 USTC 9163, 147 F2d 33 (1945),
which held to the contrary. But other
courts have held that commodity future
contracts are not securities. See, e.g.,
Corn Products Refining Co., CA-2, 54-2
USTC 166,082, 215 F2d 513 (1954),
aff'd on other grounds, SCt, 55-2 USTC
19746, 350 US 46, 76 SCt 20 (1955);
Sicanoff Vegetable Oil Corp., 27 TC
1056, Dec. 22,310 (1957), rev'd on
other grounds, CA-7, 58-1 USTC119233,
251 F2d 764 (1958).
Si
Section 1091 also does not apply to
foreign currency. See Rev. Rul. 74-218,
1974-1 CB 202. Although this market
is liquid enough to support strategic
trading, this omission is necessary,
since it would be difficult to apply the
wash sale regime in a way that was
not dramatically overbroad. In a global
economy, taxpayers engage in currency transactions all the time. Indeed,
whenever a U.S. taxpayer engages in a
transaction denominated in a foreign
currency, the tax law conceptualizes it
as a bet on the currency, as well as a
transaction in the underlying goods or
services. See generally Code Sec. 988.
Matching these transactions and disallowing losses would be administratively
difficult, and could discourage cross
border transactions (e.g., if currency
gains were immediately recognized but
currency losses were not).
82 In contrast, Section 1092 and Section
1259 do have related party rules.
Even though, in form, the taxpayer
is selling to a third party (e.g., to the
market through a broker), the related
party is purchasing at the same time
(e.g., in the same market through the
same broker). Thus, the transaction has
been treated as, in substance, between
the two related parties. See, e.g., J.P
McWilliams, SCt, 47-1 USTC 9289,
331 US 694, 67 SCt 1477 (loss disallowed under predecessor of Section 267
where husband directed broker to sell

Scrubbing the Wash Sale Rules

stock in the market and, at the same
time, instructed the broker to buy stock
in the market for his wife's account).
If applicable, Section 267 imposes a
harsher penalty than Section 1091.
Under Section 267, the disallowed
loss generally is not added to the basis
of the acquired property, and holding
period is not tacked. Although this disallowed loss may be used to reduce the
purchaser's gain, this loss cannot be
used to increase the purchaser's loss.
An exception is provided for controlled
groups of corporations. See Code Sec.
267(f)(2).
See, e.g., J.T Smith, SCt, 40-1 USTC
91 60, 308 US 473, 477-80, 60 SCt
355 (invoking "sham transaction" principles to disallow loss when taxpayer
sold depreciated asset to controlled
corporation); J. Karr, CA- 11,91 -1 USTC
50,113, 924 F2d 1018, 1022-23
(1991), off'g, D.B. Smith, 91 TC 733,
Dec. 45,110 (1988).
For instance, repurchases by a spouse
do not always trigger a wash sale. If
the purchasing spouse acts on her
own initiative, using her own means,
the selling spouse's loss should not
be disallowed. D.B. Young, 34 BTA
648, 652-53, Dec. 9420 (1 936);
TW.Behan, 32 BTA 1088, 1091-92,
Dec. 9041 (1935). In contrast, losses
are likely to be disallowed if the selling spouse exercises "dominion and
control" over securities nominally
purchased by the other spouse. E.W.
Mitchell, Est., 37 BTA 161, 166 67,
Dec. 9923 (1938) (finding that husband exercised "dominion and control"
over the securities bought by his wife,
and thus holding that husband could
not claim loss on identical securities he
had sold); G.E. Morse, 34 BTA 943,
945-46, Dec. 9463 (1936) (same).
This, it is a bad fact for the selling
spouse to place the order or to supply the funds, even if the repurchase
is for the other spouse's account. J.W
Singer, 32 BTA 177, 180, Dec. 8899
(1935); D.A. Belden, 30 BTA 601,
603-04, Dec. 8545 (1934); WE.
Bronchon, 30 BTA 404, 404-07, Dec.
8511 (1934). In addition, parents and
children tend to be treated more leniently than spouses, as are siblings.
See, e.g., Cole v. Helborn, DC Ky.,
4 FSupp 230 (1933) (permitting father to deduct loss even though he
loaned money to son so that son could
purchase the same securities the day
after father sold them); Johnston, CA6, 40-1 USTC 9108, 107 F2d 883,
884 (1939) (allowing brother to claim
loss on sale of securities, even though
brother gifted sale proceeds to sister,
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and then sister used this money to
purchase the same securities). In any
event, some believe the old cases in
this footnote may no longer be good
low, given the Supreme Court's approach in McWilliams, supra note 83,
but the precise reach of the McWilliams case is unclear
Section 1091(a) is triggered if "the
taxpayer has acquired (by purchase
or by an exchange on which the entire
amount of gain or loss was recognized
by law), or has entered into a contract
or option so to acquire, substantially
identical stock or securities."
To avoid this result, some taxpayers
take the position that Section 1091 (e)
is the exclusive rule for short sales, but
the "any sale" language of Section
1091(a) does not square easily with
this reading.
Section 1091 (a) arguably yields another
bizarre result for short sales, although
revenue rulings offer some comfort on
the issue. Arguably, Section 1091 (a) applies any time a short sale is covered at
a loss with newly acquired stock-even
if the taxpayer does not also enter into a
second short sale. For example, assume
that a taxpayer sells stock short for $100
on January 1 . On March 1, she buys
stock for $120 and covers the short at
a $20 loss. On March 1, she has both
sold stock at a loss and acquired stock
(but, obviously, has not engaged in any
strategic trading). Should this purchase
be viewed as an "acquisition" that triggers a wash sale? Rulings suggest that
this odd result should not be the answer.
See Rev. Rul. 56-602, 1956-2 CB 527
(holding that wash sale rules do not apply when taxpayer purchases property
and sells it at a loss within 30 days); LTR
8517029 (Jan. 29, 1985) (holding that
purchase of a call to cover a short call
position is subject to Section 1234, not
Section 1091).
This analysis obviously does not
hold-and so loss limitations are
less important-for property that is
marked to market under current law,
including dealer and electing trader
positions under Section 475 and
1256 contracts. Likewise, the analysis
does not hold when an interest charge
is added to tax on gains, as is the case
with PFICS. See Section 1291. Income
is also accelerated on debt securities,
although possibilities for strategic trading remain. See generally Jeff Strnad,
The Taxation of Bonds: The Tax Trading
Dimension, 81 VA. L. REv. 47 (1995)
(showing that strategic trading can
still be a serious problem for debt). An
analysis of debt securities generally is
beyond this article's scope.

See Code Sec. 1014. The long-run
status of the basis step-up is unclear.
See supra note 18.
9' Johnson, supra note 3, at 726.
9' See generally Schizer, supra note 7.
93 See generally the sources cited in note
25, supra.
9' See generally David M. Schizer, Hedging Under Section 1259, 80 TAXNOTES
345 (1998); see also Rev. Rul. 20037, supro note 55 (finding no constructive sale on variable delivery forward
contract that exposes seller to first 25
percent of appreciation plus 20 percent
of appreciation thereafter).
9' "Delta" is the change in price in one
position (e.g., the call spread) when the
other position (e.g., the loss position)
declines in value by one dollar. For
example, assume that a call option
appreciates by 20 cents when the underlying stock appreciates by a dollar.
This is a delta of .2. See Hull, supra
note 5, at 298-307.
96 See Code Sec. 1091(a).
9' See, e.g., Nijenhuis, supro note 9.
98 Under current law, the stock does not
trigger a wash sale unless it is substantially identical to the option. See supro
note 63.
9' If the stock appreciates, the loss on the
short sale isunlimited, while the loss on
the put is capped at the premium.
'00 Nor is the put substantially identical
to the underlying stock, given the economic differences between the two.
101 In response, the government might invoke Section 1233(b). For a discussion
of this issue, see supra note 53.
02 See Code Sec. 1092 (d)(2); see also Code
Sec. 246(c)(4)(C) (tolling holding period
for dividends-received-deduction if "a
taxpayer has diminished his risk of loss
of holding 1 more other positions").
103 The arguable omission of periodic
swaps is a perfect end run, discussed
above. See supra Part III.A. Further
guidance is needed to clarify how
similar the position and underlying
property need to be; at a minimum,
there needs to be a positive correlation
in their values. Thus, replacing a long
with a short should not trigger a wash
sale. Cf. supra Part III.H. The concept
could be further narrowed with the
notion of "constructive similarity" described below. See infro Part IVC.3.
'0' See supra Part III.E.
05 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 60-195, 1960-1
90

CB 300 (otherwise identical Turnpike
Authority bonds were held not to be
substantially identical because one
paid 3.45-percent interest, while the
other paid 4.5-percent interest); Rev.
Rul. 76-346, 1976-2 CB 247 (differcontinued on page 236

those taxes are only income
taxes may be similarly out of
touch with the reality of worldwide tax systems.
The links between managerial oversight and the tax system
identified above suggest that
international tax systems that
prevent efficient monitoring of
the global operations of worldwide firms, or encourage tax
haven activities, have broader
consequences for the governance
of multinational firms. Finally,
the importance of ownership
and productivity differences to
multinational firms suggests
that welfare benchmarks that
characterize FDI as mere transfers
of capital are incomplete. When
preserving the identities of owners that arise from productivity
differences is viewed as central,
new welfare benchmarks arise
that conform to widely adopted
tax policies and that do not
suggest an opposition between
national and global welfare.
Taken together, these new foundations for taxing multinational
firms further call into question
the current regime of taxing
international income and point
toward rules that conform to
these new welfare benchmarks,
that accommodate the links between tax systems and corporate
governance and that acknowledge
the artificiality of the distinction
between income and nonincome
taxes. While these new welfare
benchmarks most clearly point
to specific policies-particularly
exemption, the implications
of the proliferation of nonincome taxes and the interaction
between taxation and corporate
governance similarly suggest that
exemption of foreign income
may have other benefits associated with increased transparency,
a reduced diversion of resources
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toward tax avoidance and a greater
recognition of the tax burdens of
multinationals that do not stem
from income taxes.
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Wash Sale Rules
continued from page 88
ence in yield (6.375 percent versus 4.25
percent) is enough to render bonds not
substantially identical when coupled with
a difference in maturity dates of approximately 10 years, and the fact that one is
redeemable to pay estate taxes and the
other is not); LTR 6906200550A (June
20, 1969) (bonds are not substantially
identical where bonds that are sold have
interest rates of 4.25 percent and 4.125
percent, and bonds that are purchased
have interest rate of four percent, and
maturity and call dates are different); LTR
55121 54870A (Dec. 15, 1955) (otherwise identical bonds are not substantially
identical because of difference in yield
(3.8 percent versus 4.15 percent)).
06 See, e.g., M. Hanlin, CA-3, 39-2 USTC
9783, 108 F2d 429 (1939), aff'g, 38
BTA 811, Dec. 10,456 (1938) (ignoring
very modest differences in maturity); LTR
65122361 70A (Dec. 23, 1965) (finding
no wash sale when taxpayer replaced
bonds due on April 1997 and October
2001 and paying interest of 1.5 percent
to 5.5 percent with bonds due November 1999 and paying interest of 1.75
percent to 5.5 percent).
0? See, e.g., Reg. §1.1233-1 (d)(1) (preferred
stock of a corporation generally is not considered substantially identical to common
stock of the same corporation).
'0" In addition, an alternative argument
for avoiding a wash sale is that the
insurance contract is not a "security."
For a discussion of various definitions
of the term, see note 37, supra.
'09 The DECS is issued by a third party,
and there is (old) authority suggesting
that differences in credit are enough
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to avoid a wash sale. See generally
Part III.E., supra. There may also be an
argument that differences in economic
return render the DECS and stock not
substantially identical, although the
answer here probably depends upon
one's reading of a ruling about
convertible preferred stock. See Rev.
Rul. 77-201, 1977-1 CB 250 (finding that convertible preferred stock is
substantially identical to the underlying
common both because the two trade in
tandem and because the former is an
option within the meaning of Section
1091 (a)).
i0 Section 246 denies corporate taxpayers the dividends- received deduction in
some circumstances if they hedge their
portfolio stock. In defining hedging
broadly, Congress presumably felt that
the "substantially identical" test was not
broad enough, so they supplemented
it with the SSRP standard.
.. For a discussion of this problem, see text
accompanying notes 77 and 78, supra.
.. For example, assume that the taxpayer
sells stock for $80 and the stock price
immediately increases to $100, at
which point the taxpayer buys a $100120 call spread. In deciding whether
this call spread is "constructively similar," what value do we use for the loss
position? A value of $100 means there
clearly is a wash sale, while a value of
$80 offers an argument that there is
not (i.e., because the call spread is outof-the money). Either rule is plausible,
though the use of the sale price (i.e.,
$80) has the advantage of giving the
taxpayer credit for the full economic
exposure he bore before acquiring the
replacement position.
For a discussion of ambiguities in Section 1259, see Schizer, supra note 31.
See Reg. §1.246-5(c)()(v).
i
See Reg. §1 .246-5(c)(1)(iii).
16 This strategy was used successfully in

iS

Duke Energy Corp v. United States, DC
N.C., 49 FSupp2d 837 (1999) finding
that two portfolios are not substantially
similar).
See Reg. §1.246-5(c)(1)(vi).
I am indebted to Peter Canellos for

this idea.
19 See Schizer, supra note 7, at 1343.
120 See generally Scarborough, supra
1I

note 3.
thank Alvin Warren for this observation. As an illustration, assume that a
taxpayer has $100 of realized losses. He
also has two appreciated stocks. Stock A
has a $40 basis and a $140 fair market
value, while Stock B has a $30 basis and
a $330 fair market value. Under current
law, the taxpayer can deduct his loss by
selling Stock A. Under this straddle-type
proposal, the taxpayer has to sell both

22

23

Stocks A and B (i.e., to ensure that he
does not have $100 of unrecognized
gain anywhere in his portfolio).
Under a straddle-type standard,
for instance, taxpayers would have
a constructive sale whenever they
"substantially diminished" their risk
of loss that is, essentially whenever
they hedged. See Section 1092. For a
proposal to use a straddle-type standard for constructive sales, see Schizer,

supra note 7.

Although it would be less necessary to
defer losses, the wash sale regime would
still come under some pressure if the constructive sale regime were toughened. The
reason isthat taxpayers would have more
taxable gains, and thus would have greater use for deductible losses. Iam indebted
to Dana Trier for this observation.
29 For example, the constructive sale
and wash sale rules share a common
administrability challenge:Tthey have
to treat formally distinct transactions
as, in effect, a single transaction. A
constructive sale must treat the appreciated position and hedge as, in
effect, a sale, and a wash sale has to
treat the loss position and replacement
position as, in effect, a nonsale. The
administrability burdens are less severe if these anti-abuse rules are narrow in scope, and thus are triggered
only if the two formally separate positions are perfect economic matches.
Yet because narrow rules are easy to
avoid, at least one of these regimes
has to be quite broad. So we need to
link pairs of transactions that are not
perfect matches-indeed, far from it.
Either way, there will be significant
administrative costs.
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26 Black & Decker Corp., supra note 50.

... ChevronTexaco Corp., supra note 50.
211 See Hodges, Grant& Kaufmann, supra
note 257.

211 See Amer. Bldg.

269
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Co. v. Kokomo
Grain Co., Ind. App., 506 NE2d 56
(1987).
Kovel, supra note 36.
See Martin v. Valley Nat'l Bank of Arizo-

na, DC N.Y., 140 FRD 291 (1990).

I7,
in re Grand Jury Subpoena, DC Md.,
524 FSupp 357 (198 1); Duplon Corp.
v. Moulinage Et Retorderie de Chavanoz, CA-4, 487 F2d 480, 1973-2
TRADECAS. 74,748 (1973).
212 In re Sealed Case, CA-DC, 82-1 USTC

9335, 676 F2d 793, 809.

271 See Castle v. Sangamo Weston, Inc.,

CA-11, 744 F2d 1464 (1984); Burl-

ington Industries v. Exxon, DC Md., 65
274
217

211

FRD 26 (1974).
See, e.g., Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, supra note 143.
Permian Corp., CA-DC, 665 F2d 1214,
FED.SEC. L. REP. 98,280 (1981).
See South Chicago Bonk, DC Ill., No.

97 CR 849-1, 97 CR 849-2 (1998).

Long-Term Capitol Holdings, supro
note 5.
Long-Term Capital Holdings, DC
Conn., 2003-1 USTC 50,304 (citing
FED. R. Cv. PROC. 26(b)(3)); Adlman,
supra note 17.
279 In re von Bulow, supra note 144.
2" Long-Term Capital Holdings, DC
Conn., 2003-1 USTC 50,304.
211 Id. It should also be noted that, at least
from its factual context, In re G I Holdings, Inc., supro note 3, is similar to
Long-Term Capital Holdings. However,
in G-I Holdings, the taxpayer apparently
did not argue that the Work Product
Doctrine applied.
282 Adlman, supra note 1
7.
113
Adlman, supro note 17, 134 F3d, at
2

1199 1200.

2" Arthur Young & Co., supra note 141.
285 El Paso, supra note
93.
...See Conkling v. Turner, CA-5, 883 F2d
431 (1989), Rutgard v. Haynes, DC

Cal., 185 FRD 596 (1999). This also
argues strongly for bifurcation of the
penalty phase of these cases.

Disclosure
continued from page 152
der Code Secs. 195, 248 and 709; (6)
bad debts or cancellation of indebtedness income; (7) federal, state, local and

foreign taxes; (8) compensation of employees and independent contractors,
including stock options and pensions;
(9) charitable contributions of cash or
tangible property; (10) tax-exempt interest, including municipal bond interest;
(11) dividends as defined in Code Sec.
316 (including any dividends received
deduction), amounts treated as dividends under Code Sec. 78, distributions
of previously taxed income under Code
Secs. 959 and 1293 and income inclusions under Code Secs. 551, 951 and
1293; (12) a dividends paid deduction
by a publicly traded REIT; (13) patronage refunds or dividends of cooperatives
without a Code Sec. 267 relationship to
the taxpayer; (14) items resulting from
the application of Code Sec. 1033; (15)
items resulting from the application of

Code Sec. 354, 355, 361, 367, 368
or 1031, if the taxpayer fully complies
with the filing and reporting requirements for these sections, including any

U

